area. The seas looked the same, but there was one important difference; they were now exclusively ours. No one would be telling us what we could do here, or how we should conduct our patrol. We had achieved our first objective, the next was to find the enemy. The first move was obvious. With U.S. naval operations probably still in progress some 500 miles to the southeast, there would be no Japanese shipping in that direction, so
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headed west. Two-engine speed would take us far enough by 0300. There we would conduct our search on the following day. I wrote in my night orders:
Proceeding on course 254° true at 14 knots, 80/90
[80 percent load, 90 percent speed]
on two main engines, en route to our patrol station for tomorrow. The battery charge should be completed by about midnight. At 0300 stop, lie to, and man sound. If rolling becomes excessive, maneuver on the battery as necessary. Search our vicinity thoroughly, continuously, and diligently
.
The night was quiet, especially after we had stopped. Men coming on watch moved silently and talked in low voices and whispers. It was really not necessary, but I certainly would do nothing to alter their seriousness. Dawn came and we continued our search, now augmented by the search periscope, with
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still on the surface, lying to and maintaining quiet.
This was a far cry from accepted submarine doctrine, which dictated having way on the boat, but what is doctrine anyway? I believe it is a set of procedures, established through experience, that provides a guide. But doctrine should be flexible, never rigid, for circumstances often dictate complete departures. Our situation that day was an example of such circumstances.
In order for us to utilize speed in searching, it was first necessaryto know the general direction of the enemy’s movement. We could then proceed on a very wide zigzag ahead and thus cover a broader front as the enemy overtook. But we were presently in an open-sea area, and enemy ships might be on any track, though the northwest-southeast courses passing through the western part seemed more likely. No amount of running around at our available speeds would increase the probability of sighting the enemy. In fact, to do so would only make us a target for a submerged enemy submarine and would blank out our sound gear with our own screw noises.
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was lying to in the center of a circle some 20 miles in diameter that we had searched by radar and sound during the three hours before daylight. It was clear of any enemy. The only planes that could reach our position were patrol bombers. We could sight them and dive before they sighted us, for our diving time when lying to was only five seconds longer than when proceeding at 15 knots. The only real danger was from a submarine, but she would first have to come into the area undetected by our sound, radar, scopes, and lookouts. Then she would have to conduct a many-mile submerged approach. This would call for considerable submerged speed. Our soundman, with no interference from our own propeller noises or from other machinery, would detect her screws before she reached an attack position. The foregoing was not just conjecture or we would not be staking our lives on it.
In addition, lying to while in this open-sea area would use only the diesel fuel necessary for normal living, just a fraction of that consumed when cruising at one-engine speed. The oil we saved would be available when it might really be needed in pursuing the enemy.
There were, of course, the alternatives of a submerged patrol with high periscope searches or of periodic surfacing. Neither of these would insure the coverage we wanted, nor would they save the fuel, as we would then be charging batteries nightly.
We shifted our patrol station about 20 miles each evening so that if we were detected, shipping could not just be routed clear of a single spot. At the same time we were working south near the western boundary of our assigned area. During the