Free 100 Things Dodgers Fans Should Know & Do Before They Die by Jon Weisman Page A

could never say a Lasorda opponent wanted it more.
    This included strategy. When it came to the mind games of baseball, Lasorda was anything but passive. Not only was he always looking for opportunities to squeeze, steal, or hit-and-run, he was also looking for opportunities not to. Lasorda was all too happy to have home run hitters who could put runs on the board in a hurry. He just didn’t always have them. He truly does deserve credit for his guidance in the improbable 1988 World Series upset over the A’s. Between Kirk Gibson’s homer and Orel Hershiser’s pitching mastery were numerous decisions in which Lasorda out-maneuvered his Oakland rival, Tony LaRussa—and that could only be pulled off if his team were prepared to execute his maneuvers.
    Not surprisingly, Lasorda did not go gently into that good night. It took a heart attack to wrestle the managerial reins away from him and, even after that, he remained a figure determined to be heard, whether as general manager or special advisor. In significant ways, Lasorda represents the evolution of the Dodgers from the relatively genteel organization of Koufax and Alston to the multifaceted behemoth they are today. Lasorda has a little bit of Brooklyn bum in him, which became a chip on his shoulder that sometimes could be self-defeating but every so often became the means to some very good ends.
    â€œNobody thought we could win the division!” Lasorda shouted in 1988’s postgame celebration. “Nobody thought we could beat the mighty Mets! Nobody thought we could beat the team that won 104 games!
    â€œBut WE BELIEVED IT!”
    Or at least two people did. The two-and-only Tommys.
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    Pitching to Jack Clark
    Tommy Lasorda has not been criticized more for a single managerial decision than his choice to let Tom Niedenfuer pitch to Jack Clark with runners on second and third for St. Louis, two out in the top of the ninth inning of Game 6 of the 1985 NL Championship Series, and the Dodgers one out away from a 5–4 victory. Clark had an outstanding season (.322 TAv) for the Cardinals; the next Cardinals batter Andy Van Slyke was a rising talent at age 24, but not yet in Clark’s class overall.
    However, in the 1986 Baseball Abstract, Bill James makes a powerful argument in favor of Lasorda, noting that the Dodgers had a greater chance of preserving their lead by pitching to Clark with two on than loading the bases for Van Slyke, who had higher on-base and slugging percentages then Clark against right-handed pitching. Wrote James:
    â€œIf you walk Clark: 1) You’re bringing a better hitter to the plate facing a right-hander, 2) You’re allowing the Cardinals to tie the game with a walk, 3) You’re using up the margin of error for the pitcher, and, 4) You’re making an extra-base hit as damaging as a home run.
    â€œAgainst this you have one advantage—the fact that the veteran Clark has a well-deserved reputation as a clutch terror, while the young Van Slyke does not… Lasorda made the only reasonable move in the circumstances. It just didn’t work.”
    Nope, not at all, as Pedro Guerrero slamming his glove to the left-field ground can attest. Clark’s homer over Guerrero’s head—the second game-winning blast off Niedenfuer in as many games for St. Louis, following Ozzie Smith’s first career homer as a left-handed batter in Game 5—ended the Series, the Cardinals winning four straight games after the Dodgers had taken a 2–0 lead.
    One more option for the Dodgers would have been to walk Clark and bring in a left-hander like Jerry Reuss, who was warming up in the bullpen, to face a pinch-hitter for Van Slyke, but Reuss himself had been struggling, which made that matchup less desirable as well. It won’t end the debate, but you can make a very strong case that Niedenfuer was the right guy, in the right situation—with the wrong result.

17. Newk
    I want to write a