Free China's Territorial Disputes by Chien-Peng Chung Page A

the most willingness to conduct semi-official talks with Japan on fisheries after every incident. Note that while both Beijing and Taipei seemed to have established their claims over the rocks by invoking the authority of both CSC and EEZ concurrently, Tokyo must rely on the EEZ, because the CSC argument would deprive Japan of the entire East China Sea shelf, including the Senkaku rocks, which lie just west of the Okinawa Trough which marks the end of the shelf. Irrespective of whether the CSC or EEZ argument wins out, whichever country that stakes an actual claim on the rocks will have to regulate fishing and passage within the twelve-mile territorial sea around the rocks. This action will be construed as extremely provocative to the other disputants concerned, making the occupation authority a good target for opposing nationalist forces to provoke retaliation and involve their own governments in confrontation to achieve their aims.
    The first incident: petroleum discoveries and the Okinawa reversion (1970-1972)
    The Tiaoyutai/Senkaku controversy first reared its ugly head above the waters of the East China Sea in late 1968, when a geographical survey conducted by the Committee for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in Asian Offshore Areas (CCOP) under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in the East China Sea reported that “a high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world, with potential estimated at between 10 to 100 billion barrels.” 8 Considering that Japan, Taiwan and Korea were all major importers of oil at that time, with Japan importing 95.5 percent of its domestic demand and Taiwan importing 98 percent of its annual consumption, it is not surprising that the immediate reaction of the countries to the report was to claim sovereignty over as much of the continental shelf as was minimally defensible. 9 In May 1969, a Hong Kong news magazine reported that someone from Okinawa’s Yaeyama Islands had placed a boundary marker on the largest of the Tiaoyutai islands, claiming the islands for Okinawa. 10 On 19 July 1969, Taiwan announced she would exercise all sovereign rights over the natural resources in the sea-bed and subsoil adjacent to her territorial sea. 11 Taiwan and Gulf Oil subsequently entered into a concession contract in July 1970 to develop oil from a specific area which included the Tiaoyutai Islands. Shortly after, Japan contested this action by Taiwan on grounds that the islands belonged to the Ryukyus, and therefore, after their reversion from United States to Japanese control, the islands should belong to Japan. 12 On 12 September 1970, Japan reasserted its title to what it referred to as the Senkaku islands, but perhaps to diffuse opposition to its sovereignty claim or give the impression that it was not about to monopolize the surrounding sea-bed resources, the Japanese government indicated that it was willing to negotiate the “question” of the adjacent continental shelf with the Nationalist Government of China (Taiwan). 13 This invitation was later extended to the government of (South) Korea, but not mainland China, which at that time was still regarded by the other three governments as a Communist pariah and an illegitimate rebel Chinese regime.
    Officials from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea met in Tokyo on 21 December and formed the “China (Taiwan), Japan, (South) Korea Oceanic Development and Research United Committee.” At this meeting, which was chaired by former Japanese Premier Kishi Nobusuke, the Japanese suggested discussing “development cooperation” for the East China Sea area first and freezing the “sovereignty issue” for resolution at a later date. The meeting decided to provisionally establish a “United Oceanic Development Company” and reconvene itself in Tokyo at the end of May 1971 to finalize the running