Free The Post-American World: Release 2.0 by Fareed Zakaria Page A

tripolar, and may even become multipolar. In every realm except the military, similar shifts are underway. In general, however, the notion of a multipolar world, with four or five players of roughly equal weight, does not describe reality today or in the near future. Europe cannot act militarily or even politically as one. Japan and Germany are hamstrung by their past. China and India are still developing. Instead, the international system is more accurately described by Samuel Huntington’s term “uni-multipolarity,” or what Chinese geopoliticians call “many powers and one superpower.” The messy language reflects the messy reality. The United States remains by far the most powerful country but in a world with several other important great powers and with greater assertiveness and activity from all actors. This hybrid international system—more democratic, more dynamic, more open, more connected—is one we are likely to live with for several decades. It is easier to define what it is not than what it is, easier to describe the era it is moving away from than the era it is moving toward—hence the post-American world .
    The United States still occupies the top spot in the emerging system. It remains, in the words of the German writer Josef Joffe, “the default superpower.” But, as such, it is also the country that is most challenged by the new order. Most other great powers will see their role in the world expand. That process is already underway. China and India are becoming bigger players in their neighborhoods and beyond. Russia has ended its post-Soviet accommodation and is becoming more forceful, even aggressive. Japan, though not a rising power, is now more willing to voice its views and positions to its neighbors. Europe acts on matters of trade and economics with immense strength and purpose. Brazil and Mexico are becoming more vocal on Latin American issues. South Africa has positioned itself as a leader of the African continent. All these countries are taking up more space in the international arena than they did before.
    Consider just a few examples. Over the last decade, the United States has expanded its influence into what was for centuries the Russian sphere of influence. In the post–Cold War era of American dominance, Moscow acquiesced. It needed Washington for cash and support. But by 2008 Russia was a revived power. In mid-February 2009, the Kyrgyz Republic finalized its decision to close Manas Air Base, a U.S. base providing essential air support for operations in Afghanistan, which was particularly important after the 2005 closure of another air base in Uzbekistan. The motivation was money. The Russian government, inimically opposed to the idea of a semipermanent U.S. military presence in its backyard, offered a $2.3 billion aid package that dwarfed the American financial support and included $180 million in debt cancellation, $150 million in aid, and a $2 billion loan to complete the construction of a hydroelectric power station. (In the end, it turned out that Kurmanbek Bakiyev, then president of Kyrgyzstan, was playing both sides off each other. After extracting the deal from Russia, his government renegotiated a much higher rent from the Americans and agreed to let Manas remain open as a “transit center.”)
    Even a new American ally like India maintains its independence from the United States. New Delhi is grateful to Washington for its support in legitimizing India as a normal nuclear power, but it still pushed back on core security issues. Despite much American pressure, India simply does not see Iran as the threat that the United States does. India agreed to vote once with the United States at the International Atomic Energy Agency but continues to have extensive contact with Iran, including the conducting of joint naval exercises. India sees Iran as a commercial partner and refuses to isolate it in any way. In April 2008, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s pilots requested a