positioning of each unit's tents and baggage to the duties carried out by various contingents, so that for instance the triarii always provided guards for the horse lines. The responsibility of various officers to supervise the sentries and pickets around the camp and to transmit orders for the next day's march were all clearly allocated.
In most years the Roman Republic fielded four legions. Each consul was given an army of two legions and two alae. In battle the legions formed the centre of the line with one ala on either flank. For this reason the alae were often known as the Left and Right ala. Legions were usually numbered, one consul commanding the First and Third Legions, the other the Second and Fourth. It appears that all the legions in existence were renumbered every year so few of these units developed a lasting sense of esprit de corps or identity. It was rare before 264 for a praetor to be given a military command, but during the Punic Wars this was to become common. A Praetorian army usually consisted of only one legion and ala. Each year the consuls were first allocated the most important and largest scale operations, and then praetors were put in charge of smaller campaigns. Usually a Roman legion mustered 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry on formation, but this was not a fixed size, rigidly imposed. According to the Senate's judgement of the strength of the opposition, the size of the legion could be increased to 5,000, 5,200, or even 6,000. This was done by enlarging the maniples of the hastati and principes and increasing the number of velites. This did not require any significant change in the legion's organization or tactical system. In exactly the same way the size of the ala could be increased, which may in part explain the variation in the recorded size of Latin cohorts. In times of extreme crisis, each consul might be given four instead of two legions. 30
The Roman army of this period operated most efficiently at the level of the consular army of two legions and two alae. This force of at least 20,000 men was well balanced, perhaps ten per cent of the total consisting of cavalry, and had a clear command structure leading up to the unchallenged authority of the consul. It was sufficient for most tasks, but there was no clear mechanism for providing the command structure of an army composed of the forces of more than one consul. The temporary office of dictator, whose authority superseded that of all other magistrates, was exceedingly rare. When two consuls joined forces then each man held command on alternate days. The system was not ideal and was used by later authors to explain some of the early disasters of the Second Punic War. However, earlier in the third century both consuls had occasionally joined forces and seem to have operated without major problems. Both consular armies also participated in the victory at Telamon in 225; but in this case the actions of the two armies were not concerted but the result of a happy chance, since both consuls had been unaware of the other's presence before the battle. The system of shared command was not ideal, but it may have taken a commander of Hannibal's great ability to exploit the opportunities it offered to an opponent. 31
It took time to form a Roman army and then train and drill it to a reasonable standard. Throughout their history, the Romans' concept of the ideal commander was always a man who carefully trained and prepared his army before risking them in battle. The longer legions and alae remained in service the more opportunity they had to drill and the more experience they gained, so that steadily their efficiency increased. The armies which served for much of the Second Punic War were eventually indistinguishable from professional soldiers. The weakness of the Roman system was that every time the legions were discharged and a new army raised, the whole process had to start again from scratch. Most levies of citizens included men with prior
J. S. Cooper, Helen Cooper