Free Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice by Naomi Roht-Arriaza Page A

mechanisms is rather more synergistic than many might have thought. The complexities of the matter are well‐illustrated in the saga of attempts to establish a truth commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the evolving view of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia from one of virtual opposition [46] to one that might be characterized as benign tolerance. [47] These issues are likely to be at the top of the agenda of the Prosecutor of the new International Criminal Court as he wrestles with the adequacy of domestic responses to atrocity in assessing the potential admissibility of cases under Article 17 of the Rome Statute. [48] Perhaps the unfolding practice in Sierra Leone will convince him of the usefulness of a genuinely complementary approach, by which international prosecution coexists with alternative accountability mechanisms, rather than the context of antagonism and confrontation that many observers expect.
    Although there had been some discussion within Sierra Leone about the importance of a truth commission prior to its establishment, the idea was obviously borrowed from elsewhere. It seems open to question whether Sierra Leone would have organised a truth commission had this not been promoted and encouraged by the “international community.” If the United Nations had insisted that Sierra Leone contribute a reasonable proportion of the costs of the venture, it would probably never have seen the light of day. Sierra Leone is an extremely poor country, and it could never have been expected to shoulder a large part of the expense of a truth commission. Still, the insignificant participation in the TRC's funding by Sierra Leone and by Sierra Leoneans can only have affected negatively the sense of ownership. Sierra Leone is a graveyard to wonderful international initiatives, established by generous funders, which are left abandoned and decaying when the foreign support concludes. Why should the TRC be any different?
    With the presentation of its report, the Commission formally went out of existence. The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 provided for follow‐up mechanisms, to ensure that the recommendations are implemented. It seems likely that the real successor of the Commission may be the new Human Rights Commission, which will be a permanent institution. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has fulfilled its general objectives, and it seems likely that the Special Court will do the same. The problem is not with the viability of the transitional justice institutions, but with the limited nature of the overall transition within Sierra Leone.A useful comparison can be made with South Africa, where the transitional justice institutions were part of a much broader social transformation, driven by an extremely dynamic civil society. Sierra Leone lags far behind South Africa in this respect. And this sad conclusion inevitably limits the potential of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission to influence the future of this troubled country.
     
    [1] See, for background: Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996; Oxford: James Currey, 1998).
     
     
    [2] Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), November 30, 1996.
     
     
    [3] For discussion of the legal status of the agreement, see: Prosecutor v. Kallon et al . (Case Nos. SCSL‐2004‐15 and 16‐AR72(E) ), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction (Lomé Accord Amnesty), March 13, 2004.
     
     
    [4] Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone , Lomé, July 7, 1999, Art. IX. See, e.g.: Daniel Macaluso, “Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the Lome Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, (2001) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 27, p.