Free Merchants in the Temple by Gianluigi Nuzzi Page B

million). Fifty-eight million euros are sitting in the vaults of the Merrill Lynch commercial bank. At Credit Suisse 46.5 million is held. Between 2011 and 2012, all this money has guaranteed truly modest interests: only 2,979,015 euros, not even one percent, a ridiculously low rate. Why? And above all, why are the set-aside euros not used?

    Thirteen Unanswered Questions
    Francis’s men were left speechless by the financial report. By carefully examining the information they had received, the financial consultants working for the Commission found numerous irregularities, rather obvious mistakes, and various discrepancies. After reviewing it for a few days, in the late afternoon of February 10, 2014, Filippo Sciorilli Borrelli of McKinsey decided to make his move. He sent Zahra thirteen questions about the finances of the Secretariat of State. Precise questions regarding deposits, expenses, and the actual management of the Pence. The first question concerned the interest rates, which were too low. How was this possible? His findings left no uncertainties:
    In the document it is stated that the average annual interest rate recognized by the IOR for the Peter’s Pence Fund [generated] three million euros in 2012. In 2012 89.5 million euros were deposited at the IOR. Does this mean that the interest rate was three percent? Is this statement true or false?
    If true—and there was no reason to doubt that it was—then it is not clear, “what to make of the interests on the other known deposits (for example, the 58 million at Merrill Lynch). If the above statement is false, then how do you explain that the overall interest rate is barely one percent of the total funds invested (in 2012, three million in interest on a base of 377.9 million euros)?”
    Sciorelli Borelli wanted to know why the annual deposit made by the Holy Father to the Osservatore Romano (5.3 million in 2011, and 5.6 in 2012) does “not appear under the item ‘to cover the deficit,’ although it falls under the deficits of the Curia?” And, “To what does the item Peter’s Pence c/allocations of 7.3 million in 2012 and 2.1 in 2011 correspond?” Finally, when you look at the actual deposits in the various banks of the 371.6 million indicated as the Peter’s Pence reserve fund (2011), only 353.4 is accounted for, “a discrepancy of 18.2 million euros. How do you explain this negative difference?” 8
    The answers were not forthcoming. The thirteen questions never became official. They never even left “Area 10,” which holds the most important secrets of the Commission’s work. So COSEA had to make do with partial and often misleading reports. It’s difficult to say the exact reason why. Some in the Apostolic Palaces believe that both in the leadership of the Commission and within the Secretariat of State, the usual practice was to nip in the bud any question whose results might be unpredictable.
    The same dilemma had beset Ettore Gotti Tedeschi, the former President of IOR, when he wanted to avail himself of the top consultants on the issue of money laundering, originating from the Banca d’Italia, to get the Vatican on the “white list” of the countries in compliance with the rules of financial propriety. On this project, Benedict XVI was subject to the influence of Bertone’s men, who discredited Gotti Tedeschi and altered his proposals claiming that he would expose the Vatican to dangerous interference by the central bank of a foreign state. Tradition dictates that in the Curia the influence, weight, and power of a layperson is always inferior to that of a cleric, regardless of whether he is a cardinal or a simple priest, and regardless of whether he knows how to manage bookkeeping and financial reports or is completely inadequate to the task.

    The Secret Bank Accounts of the Pope
    The financial situation of the Secretariat of State was a web of confusion and major