Free Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw by Norman Davies Page A

passed, any careful observer could have seen that the American facade of back-slapping bonhomie concealed a strong desire to avoid serious commitments. The US Government never shared the hostile political views of certain influential voices within American opinion, such as that of the publicist and commentator Walter Lippmann, who saw no reason why the First Ally’s republic should be restored. 27 At the same time, it did not regard assistance to the First Ally as one of its responsibilities. Instances of prevaricationmultiplied. For over a year, for example, the exiled Government had been urging Washington to replace Ambassador Drexel Biddle, who had left his post in London in mid-1943. But the State Department showed little sense of urgency. A replacement, Arthur Bliss Lane, was found in July 1944; but he was kept waiting throughout the summer for confirmation by the Senate, and he never reached London in time to present his credentials. 28 Repeated delays over the supply of twelve long-range aircraft were still more frustrating. Ever since Gen. Sikorski’s visit to Washington in December 1942, the exiled Government had been expecting delivery of these planes, which were intended to form an independent wing for liaison with the Polish Underground. Considering that the US was ferrying hundreds of new aircraft to Britain every month, the request was very modest. Indeed, it appears to have been accepted in principle. But it generated any number of excuses, and was never actually met. Instead, the exiled Government was informed of the availability of other types of equipment:
S/Ops/4391
1st July 1944
    To: Maj. M. J. T. Pickles [War Office]
From: Lt. Pudding
We have received a signal from our representative in the USA, that he can obtain through Lendlease a Motion Picture Sound Projector, Automatic Motion Picture Camera Portable Film Recorder . . . together with single Film Recording System all 35mm, but before making further arrangements it is necessary that clearance be made through the War Office for these goods . . . 29
    This letter from Lt. ‘Pudding’ to Maj. Pickles needs no commentary.
    When Stalin broke off diplomatic relations with the First Ally in April 1943 over the Katyn affair, he did so suddenly, brutally, and, as it later proved, on totally unjustified grounds. Since he had personally signed the order to execute the Polish officers, he knew exactly what he was doing. He was testing the political waters of the Grand Alliance to see just how far he could go. If he was right in believing that he could push the British and Americans to connive in a monstrous falsehood about the mass murder of their friends, he could be confident about pushing them to the brink on many less sensitive matters. British officialdom found itself in a quandary. The secret report on Katyn, prepared by Sir Owen O’Malley, ambassador to the exiled Government, pointed to the probability of Soviet guilt. But it proved so unpalatable to the proSoviet prejudices of the majority of his colleagues that they preferred to feign confusion and toadmit nothing. All the Western information services were instructed to follow the Soviets and to describe Katyn as a German crime. 30
    In mid-1944, a second problem arose. It concerned Moscow’s demands for the repatriation of ‘Soviet citizens’ who were falling into Western hands in ever-increasing numbers. Whenever British or American armies overran districts relieved of German Occupation, they invariably captured men and women from Eastern Europe who had either been used by the Nazis for slave labour or who had served under German command in one of the collaborationist formations. Some Allied officials thought the matter quite straightforward. ‘The Russians want their people back, just as we want our people back.’ But others could spot a trap. For one thing, many of the alleged ‘Soviet citizens’ were not Soviet citizens at all. For another, those who came from the First Ally’s eastern