Free The Miernik Dossier by Charles McCarry Page A

HEADQUARTERS DISCUSSION AND ADVICE IDEA THAT PRINCE KALASH EL KHATAR MIGHT WELL FILL THE BILL.
    3. KHARTOUM REALIZES YOUNG KHATAR HAS NO GREAT REPUTATION FOR ENERGY AND STABILITY BUT THIS SHOULD MATTER LITTLE TO ALF’S SOVIET MASTERS AS HE HAS GREATEST NAME IN SUDAN.
    4. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT INSERTION OF KHATAR AS TITULAR HEAD ALF MAKES GREAT OPERATIONAL SENSE: WE KNOW KHATAR DOES NOT SYMPATHIZE WITH ALF OR ANY REBEL GROUP AND WE HAVE EXCELLENT ACCESS TO HIM THROUGH HIS FATHER AND THROUGH CHRISTOPHER.
    5. KHATARS FATHER WOULD PROBABLY AGREE SO LONG AS HIS SON’S SAFETY COULD BE GUARANTEED. WE ARE IN POSITION TO MAKE THIS GUARANTEE BECAUSE OF OUR CONTROL OF FIRECRACKER WHO INCREASINGLY EMERGES AS STRONGEST FIGURE IN ALF LEADERSHIP AND COULD THEREFORE EFFECTIVELY PROTECT YOUNG KHATAR FROM BODILY HARM.
    6. SUDANESE SECURITY SERVICE WOULD HAVE TO BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF KHATARS ROLE AS AGENT PROVOCATEUR TO PROTECT HIM FROM SUSPICIONS AND REPRISALS FROM HIS FAMILY’S ENEMIES IN SUDANESE ESTABLISHMENT. AFTER DESTRUCTION OF ALF YOUNG KHATAR COULD BE REVEALED IN PRESS AS HERO SHARING CREDIT WITH SUDANESE POLICE. THIS FORMULA SHOULD RECOMMEND ITSELF EQUALLY TO KHATAR FAMILY WHICH NEEDS CREDIT WITH GOVERNMENT AND TO GOVERNMENT WHICH NEEDS CREDIT WITH NUMEROUS AND INFLUENTIAL BAKHENT SECT.
    7. ALF ALREADY AWARE IMPENDING VISIT YOUNG KHATAR THROUGH REPORTING OF ALF FOLLOWER IN GENEVA CONSULATE. FIRECRACKER STATES HIS COLLEAGUES REGARD YOUNG KHATAR AS LIKELY FIGUREHEAD AS THEY BELIEVE HE HAS QUARRELED WITH HIS FATHER AND NEEDS MONEY.
    8. SCENARIO WE ENVISAGE WOULD INVOLVE RECRUITMENT OF KHATAR AS ALF FIGUREHEAD BY FIRECRACKER. NEITHER OF COURSE WOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE OTHER’S CONNECTION TO US. IF GENEVA AGREES WE WOULD USE CHRISTOPHER WHO HAS ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUNG KHATAR AS CUTOUT BETWEEN LATTER AND THIS STATION FOR DURATION OF OPERATION.
    9. WE FEEL SOME URGENCY ON BASIS FIRECRACKER’S REPORT THAT ALF IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO INSTALL FIGUREHEAD LEADER BY MID-JULY. TERROR CAMPAIGN WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. STEPS TO PREVENT THIS CAMPAIGN MUST BE TAKEN SOONEST IF THEY ARE TO BE TAKEN AT ALL.
    10. WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO INSTALLATION OF FIGUREHEAD WE CAN CONTROL. VALUE OF SUCH INSURANCE SHOULD FIRECRACKER BECOME NONOPERATIONAL THROUGH ACCIDENT OR EXPOSURE IS OBVIOUS.
29.  R EPORT BY C HRISTOPHER’S CASE OFFICER IN G ENEVA.
    1. Christopher, in a verbal report delivered to the undersigned on 9 June, states that Miernik has abandoned his pretense of reluctance with respect to the trip to Khartoum. He is now ready to accompany Khatar and Christopher. The date of departure is 12 June.
    2. Per instructions, I sounded Christopher out on possibility of recruiting Khatar as short-term asset for a specific operation. No details of this operation were communicated to Christopher. Christopher says as follows: “You are out of your minds.” He does not believe that Khatar would place himself in the position of working under the discipline of a foreign intelligence service. He does not believe that Khatar has any political motivation whatsoever, apart from a desire to maintain the position of his family in Sudan. Money would be no temptation to Khatar, who has an apparently inexhaustible supply of cash from the Bakhent faithful wherever he goes. (Christopher has heard him call up a follower, demand five thousand Swiss francs, and have the money delivered in an hour’s time.) Christopher objects, finally, to revealing himself as a U.S. agent to Khatar. If instructed to do so, he would naturally comply, but with serious misgivings.
    3. Based on Christopher’s reaction, though not on any articulated suspicion, I assume he realizes that our interest in Khatar is connected to the Miernik operation. He has not been told full details of our suspicions vis-à-vis Miernik, nor has he been fully briefed concerning the Anointed Liberation Front. If the operation proceeds as Khartoum envisages, Christopher should be put into the