adapt, and overcome. He was an instinctive flyer who exhibited what would later be called excellent “situational awareness.” Both men were deadly serious about their work; they simply approached it differently. Werner Voss, however, was by far a better natural pilot and was held in very high regard by his enemies. After twenty-four kills he was awarded the Pour le Mérite in April 1917.
“Bloody April,” it was called by the British, and April 1917 was exactly that. Bloody and a turning point in the war—both on the ground and in the air. The new Allied leadership had promised results, and now they had to deliver. French general Robert Nivelle won approval for a plan that he vowed would break the stalemate and end the war. The British (meaning Colonial and Dominion troops, such as Canadians, Indians, and the ANZAC) would attack east of Arras and capture Vimy Ridge. This, they hoped, would attract German attention and troops away from Nivelle’s assault. The French would go over the top near the river Aisne and punch a hole in the German lines above the Chemin des Dames. * The armies would drive north and east, respectively, and link up behind the German rear.
British and French generals alike had no confidence in the plan. It hadn’t accounted for the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, nor would there be any real cooperation between the BEF on the northern flank and the French to the south. The biggest reason that waiting made sense was the imminent involvement of the Americans.
Failing to defeat the Royal Navy at Jutland the previous year, the German High Seas Fleet had no real way to fight at sea except with its U-boats. To break the naval blockade and force the Allies to the bargaining table, Germany had resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917, and by the end of March seven American merchant ships had been sunk. Additionally, the Americans had decoded the infamous Zimmermann Telegram, which offered German support to Mexico against the United States if Washington declared war against the Central Powers.
April’s weather was also horrible, with rain, sleet, and even snow accompanied by gale-force westerly winds. There was no urgent strategic reason to attack the German positions and every incentive to wait. But Nivelle had a reputation from the Battle of Verdun and was intent on furthering his military and political ambitions. With his Gallic charm, unaccented English, and self-confidence, he’d persuaded the new British prime minister, David Lloyd George, that his plan would succeed. Lloyd George overrode the objections from his generals and placed the BEF under French command for the offensive. Understandably, the British, especially the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service, were incensed.
The attack was to commence on April 8 following days of concentrated artillery bombardments, extensive photo reconnaissance, and scores of army cooperation (close-air-support) missions to destroy ammo dumps, railroads, communications, and airfields. The RFC had a clear superiority in numbers with its 754 aircraft, of which about 350 were single-seat scouts. The Germans possessed 250 single-seat scouts out of 480 operational planes. Ironically, just as the Royal Navy had proven at the Battle of Jutland that quality defeats quantity, so now the Luftstreitkräfte would prove the same lesson with their superior aircraft.
Every hostile machine completely outmanoeuvred us and were capable of beating us in climbing, turning and speed.
—2ND LT. GEOFFREY COCK, 45 SQUADRON RFC
Though numerically larger, the forty-one squadrons of the RFC and RNAS generally flew obsolete aircraft such as the BE-2, FE-2, and DH-2. All had performed well enough during the battles of 1916, but German aviation had made tremendous strides since then. The imperative to regain air superiority that brought Boelcke back to the front and would permit von Richthofen to create the unit known as the “Flying Circus” was very