would
be tragic if we prematurely withdrew our support for him and by so doing denied him the opportunity to return Egypt to a more
democratic society. Thank you.”
“Sir!”
“Sir!”
“What about Israel’s claim that—”
John Keegan smiled and quickly walked away.
* * *
Dartley had no trouble at Cairo International Airport. He was required to change $150 into Egyptian currency at the official
rate, since he did not have a visa (Malleson hadn’t wanted to stretch things by applying for a genuine visa with Dartley’s
fake credentials in the name of Thomas Lewis). As Dartley passed out of customs, he picked up a map to the city at the Tourist
Office desk. He was not being observed. Then he took a black-and-white cab to the Nile Hilton, where a room had been reserved
for Mr. Lewis.
So far he hadn’t noticed any anti-American displays, and certainly the Hilton, Sheraton and other American investments had
not been seized like they had in Iran. Dartley’s problem was that he now had to make a move, but in what direction he couldn’t
tell. There was no reason why doing one thing was better than another, so far as he could see.
Egypt was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thus was open to the inspectors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the United Nations’ body charged with halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The inspectors checked nuclear
inventories, affixed seals to prevent diversion of material for unauthorized use and scanned millions of photos taken by sealed
automatic cameras they installed in the plants.
But there were ways around these inspectors. For example, Iraq was thought to have made plutonium for bombs secretly from
its big stockpile of natural uranium. Natural uranium in the form of yellowcake was not something the agency inspectors kept
trackof. The yellowcake had been secretly refined in a hot-cell laboratory that Iraq had bought from Italy. The refined uranium
was then irradiated in the reactor, between agency inspections, to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Israeli warplanes interrupted
that project. France had supplied the reactor and fuel to the Iraqis, and they were supposed to have technicians on the spot
to stop all irregularities. Dartley could sympathize with the French. They had been made to look like fools on two scores—first,
the Iraqis had apparently tricked them, and then the Israelis had showed themselves to be more alert and more decisive.
Since those times Iraq had gotten bogged down financially in its war with Iran; the revolution in Iran had more or less put
an end to nuclear research there; and Libya was still unsuccessful in its attempts to buy readymade atom bombs. Dartley could
see the Egyptian point of view. There were no longer ties between Egypt and Israel, and if Egypt could develop a nuclear capability,
the country would regain its leadership of the Arab world. That was an understandable aim, and even an acceptable one had
it not been for the fact that this would put the near-ultimate weapon of destruction in the hands of Ahmed Hasan and the Light
of Islam mullahs.
The Viscount had done his homework all right. Dartley’s head was now filled with facts, but facts were one thing and what
to do with them was another. He had been immediately attracted by the list of Egyptian scientists who had recently returned
from abroad. Malleson identified one among them as by far the most important, a Mustafa Bakkush. If hecould be located, the bomb would not be far away. He was an internationally famous man and would not be so easy to hide. There
would be talk. Certainly, asking around for a man would be easier than for a bomb.
Dartley lay back on the bed in his luxury room at the Nile Hilton and wondered how to start. It had been easy to use his bogus
identity as a wheat expert at the airport, but it might be quite difficult with knowledgeable people. His best bet would probably
be to