occupiers still viewed the region as racially and culturally infe-
rior. Civilians were subjected to profoundly demeaning treatment. More
fundamentally, the region fell prey to a campaign of economic exploita-
tion in some ways even more ruthless than the one in the West.87
All this was intrinsic to a new kind of warfare that instrumentalized
civilians like never before. It also included the terroristic killing of civil-
ians that had taken place in the war’s opening weeks. “Necessary” harsh-
ness towards civilians was another facet of the Great War that impressed
itself upon many offi cers.88
But while systematized exploitation was desired, wild exploitation—
the kind that threatened the troops’ discipline and longer-term inter-
ests—emphatically was not. In time, the subject of military discipline
within both the German and Austro-Hungarian armies during the Great
War would become of great interest to the German army under the Third
Reich. For the army would come to believe that it was the steady erosion
of that discipline that had sapped the troops’ fi ghting power and made
them more susceptible to the “pernicious” ideology of Bolshevism.
Discipline problems became apparent at the very outset of the cam-
paigns in both East and West. In late August 1914 II Bavarian Army
Corps, embroiled in fi ghting on the Franco-German border, reported
that “(despite) the instructions issued in the Corps command of
8/22/14, there are still cases of the rough seizure of inhabitants’ private
property. The men are to be repeatedly instructed that every unauthor-
ized seizure . . . is to be regarded as plunder and, in accordance with
judicial military regulations, punished with imprisonment of at least 43
days.”89 In the East, Austro-Hungarian III Corps reported in Septem-
ber of the same year that “lone soldiers, excluded from all regular sup-
ply and mostly without or with only very little in the way of cash, have
begun to maraud, indeed plunder, and therefore constitute an acute
danger to discipline.”90
By 1916, indiscipline was affecting the troops’ general morale, fi ght-
ing spirit, and respect for superiors. This was a portent of the increas-
ingly widespread erosion of discipline that would affl ict the Central
powers’ armies during the war’s fi nal year. By August 1916 I Bavarian
Army Corps was describing how “on numerous trips within the corps
area, defi cient posture, dishevelled dress and poor acknowledgement of
Forging a Wartime Mentality 47
superiors became increasingly apparent in the troops marching along
the roads.”91 Matters were worse just months later, when in December
II Bavarian Army Corps reported mounting cases of self-mutilation.92
“The robustness of the offi cers and men has left much to be desired in
recent times,” the commander of the 11th Austro-Hungarian Field Artil-
lery Brigade, with which Walter Hinghofer was serving, declared in
December 1917. “I make all regimental commanders personally respon-
sible for raising military spirit in all our batteries.”93 Indiscipline also
made itself felt in other forms; on the Italian front in May 1918, the 14th
Austro-Hungarian Infantry Regiment gave vent to its desperation at the
rising incidence of venereal disease. “The men are to be strenuously
reminded,” the regiment directed, “that contracting such diseases is
punishable, for it is due to this that men have to withdraw from war
service for a long period.”94
One reason why discipline was deteriorating was increasing lack of
supply. This was the inevitable result of the Central powers’ material
disadvantage at the war’s start, the privations caused by the British naval
blockade, the ineptitude of German and Austro-Hungarian rationing,
and the two powers’ inability to exploit their occupied territories more
effectively.95 In October 1918 the 11th Austro-Hungarian Infantry Divi-
sion, stationed on the Italian