Free The Hunt for bin Laden by Tom Shroder Page A

the “jackpot rate” — strikes hitting their intended target — jumped from 35 percent to more than 80 percent.
    His decision to assign the operation to the Navy SEALs, a Special Operations unit with extensive experience in raids on high-value targets, was critical. SEALs have a tradition of moving in and out fast, often killing everyone they encounter at a target site. Most members of the SEAL team in the bin Laden raid had been deployed to war zones a dozen or more times.
    The “pattern of life” study of the compound had shown that about a dozen women and children periodically frequented it. Specific orders were issued to the SEALs not to shoot the women or children unless they were clearly threatening or had weapons. Bin Laden was to be captured, one official said, if he “conspicuously surrendered.”
    The longer such raids take, the greater the risk to the SEALs. One senior official said the general philosophy of the SEALs is: “If you see it, shoot it. It is a house full of bad guys.”
    Several assessments concluded that there was a 60 to 80 percent chance bin Laden was in the compound. Michael E. Leiter, head of the National Counterterrorism Center, was much more conservative. During one White House meeting, he put the probability at about 40 percent.
    When a participant suggested that was a low chance of success, Leiter said, “Yes, but what we’ve got is 38 percent better than we have ever had before.”
    Obama himself put the odds of success at barely better-than-even.
    He knew he had only circumstantial evidence, and he worried that the Navy SEALs would find only a “prince from Dubai” instead of the world’s most-wanted terrorist leader. He knew that f it turned out to be the former, the country — and his administration — would face serious consequences.
    But ultimately, Obama would say after the raid: “I concluded it was worth it. We have devoted enormous blood and treasure in fighting back against al-Qaeda, ever since 2001. And I said to myself that if we have a good chance of not completely defeating but badly disabling al-Qaeda, then it was worth both the political risks as well as the risks to our men, after a pursuit that cost billions of dollars and stretched for nearly a decade.”
    At 8:20 a.m. Friday, April 29, the president approved the raid.
    That Sunday night (Monday in Pakistan), the president and his national security team gathered in the White House Situation Room to watch the operation unfold on a soundless video feed. During the assault, one of the Black Hawk helicopters stalled, but the pilot was able to land safely. The hard landing disabled the helicopter, forcing the SEALs to abandon a plan to have one team rope down from a Black Hawk and come into the main building from the roof. Instead, both teams assaulted the compound from the ground.
    Members of the assault team blew their way through some doors and walls to enter. They opened one door only to find a cement wall behind it.
    As they entered, one of bin Laden’s couriers was the only enemy to open fire, officials said. The SEALs encountered no other armed opposition as they ascended to the top floor, where bin Laden was found in the doorway to his room. He turned back into the room before being shot twice — in the head and in the chest. U.S. commandos later found an AK-47 and a pistol in the room.
    “He was retreating,” a move that was regarded as resistance, a U.S. official briefed on the operation said. “You don’t know why he’s retreating, what he’s doing when he goes back in there. Is he getting a weapon? Does he have a [suicide] vest?”
    SEALs scooped up dozens of computer thumb drives and several hard drives that analysts rushed to examine for information about al-Qaeda, especially an address, location or cellphone number for Zawahiri.
    The early analysis of the materials would show that bin Laden was preoccupied with attacking the United States over all other targets, a fixation that led to