Free How We Know What Isn't So by Thomas Gilovich Page A

observer is blind in this way, his or her expectations about what “should” happen in the experiment cannot bias his or her behavior.
    * Fittingly, P. T. Barnum also said that a good circus, like these bogus personality descriptions, should have “something for everybody.”
    * This is not to suggest that these two beliefs are false. Indeed, both have been subsequently supported by more rigorous evidence: Identical twins do tend to have somewhat similar personalities (see R. Plomin. Special section on developmental behavior genetics. Child Development , 1983, 54 , 331-55), and stress can in fact lead to cancer (see L. S. Sklar, & H. Anisman, Stress and Cancer. Psychological Bulletin , 1981, 89, 369-406). Note, however, that our confidence in the validity of these beliefs must rest on this more carefully collected evidence, and not on common anecdotal accounts that are subject to the problem of multiple endpoints.

TWO
Motivational and Social
Determinants of
Questionable Beliefs
     

THREE
Examples of
Questionable and
Erroneous Beliefs
     

9
Belief in the Effectiveness of
Questionable Interpersonal
Strategies
     
    And oftentimes excusing of a fault Doth make the fault the worse by the excuse.
    William Shakespeare, King John
     

    T here are many wonderful things about teaching at Cornell University, one of the best being the faculty tennis courts. The courts are located at the bottom of a gorge on the edge of campus and they offer the faculty tennis player visual splendor, shelter from annoying winds, and a soft clay surface that slows the pace, extends rallies, and generally creates the illusion of having more skill than one actually possesses. I was playing on these courts recently when I overheard something like the following conversation between two nationally-known scholars and locally-known tennis enthusiasts.
    P LAYER 1: “This ought to be interesting; I haven’t had a chance to get on the court in a couple of weeks.”
    P LAYER 2: “I like having a layoff now and then. I feel fresh when I come back, and I feel like I can concentrate better.” ( Players 1 & 2 exchange further small talk)
    P LAYER 2 : “My knee is really bothering me. I twisted it while playing last week and haven’t had the same mobility since. Maybe I should see an orthopedic guy.”
    P LAYER 1: “Umm.” (Players 1 & 2 engage in further small talk, and then, after the first game …)
    P LAYER 1: “I’m not happy with the way they strung my racket. I can’t seem to get the same pace on the ball. Where do you get yours strung?” (Player 2 returns to the baseline, seemingly not having heard the question.)

    As a social psychologist, this dialogue was unusually interesting to me because it nicely illustrates a phenomenon I describe in some of my courses, a phenomenon known as “self-handicapping.” Self-handicapping refers to our attempts to manage how others perceive us by controlling the attributions they make for our performance. By drawing attention to those elements that inhibit performance, the self-handicapper tries to induce the other person to discount a potential failure. Under such trying circumstances, it is implied, anyone would have failed. And things are even better if we succeed: Logically, the other person should augment his or her impressions of our ability. Anyone capable of overcoming such obstacles must be gifted indeed.
    There really are two classes of self-handicapping strategies, real and feigned. “Real” self-handicapping involves placing visible obstacles to success in one’s own path. The obstacles make one less likely to succeed, but they provide a ready excuse for failure. The student who neglects to study before an exam or the aspiring actor who drinks before an audition are good examples. Sometimes failure is all but guaranteed, but at least one will not be thought to be lacking in the relevant ability (or so it is hoped).
    “Feigned” self-handicapping, on the other hand, is in certain respects a less