Free The Everlasting Empire by Yuri Pines Page B

degree of their commitment to the unification of All-under-Heaven, and how did this commitment (or the lack thereof) influence their position vis-à-vis their Chinese subjects? The answer to this question, I hope, will help elucidate a rarely noticed aspect of the complex process of the nomads’ adaptation to Chinese political culture.
    The nomadic and seminomadic neighbors of China conquered significant portions of China proper, including its historical heartland in the Yellow River and Wei River basins in the early fourth century CE, ushering in the period of “Northern and Southern dynasties” (318–589). The nomads were drawn into China’s internal affairs almost incidentally; but once in charge of northern China, the conquerors had to adapt themselves to their new role as rulers of sedentary society. 66 This adaptation was a multifaceted process that cannot be discussed here in full; but it is important to note that the nomads did not mechanically copy Chinese practices but rather adjusted them to the peculiarities of their native society and to their own political culture. This complexity is duly observable in their employment of the idea of unified rule.
    The nomads had their own concept of Great Unity: they believed that the high god of the steppe, Heaven/Tengri, confers the right to rule on a single charismatic clan. This notion had already emerged vividly in the Xiongnu empire, and it surely influenced the nomadic rulers of China in their endorsement of the Chinese idea of unified rule. However, ostensible similarities notwithstanding, the nomads’ idea of unity differed from that of the Chinese in three marked respects. First, Tengri did not bestow his
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mandate on every generation; hence, in contrast to the Chinese case, the unity of the pastoralists was not conceived of as a natural state of affairs but rather as a peculiar situation attainable only under truly charismatic leaders or in times of crisis; political fragmentation was therefore a tolerable situation. Second, demographic and economic peculiarities of the pastoral economy precluded the establishment of a tightly centralized Chinese-style empire in the steppe; hence the nomads’ “unity” was intrinsically lax and, with a few exceptions, tolerant of a much greater degree of regional autonomy than was acceptable in China proper. Third, for most nomadic rulers (Mongols are a notable exception) ruling “Allunder-Heaven” actually meant ruling “the felt tent dwellers,” that is, the steppe world only. Therefore they were usually satisfied with establishing their rule over the pastoralists but did not seek to rule sedentary China, and their notion of unity was intrinsically more limited than was the Chinese ideal. 67
    This background explains why the nomadic rulers of the northern dynasties in the fourth-sixth centuries did not wholeheartedly commit themselves to the goal of unification, despite occasional proclamations of their intention to unify the realm. Their hesitation derived in part from practical considerations: nomadic cavalryman could not easily penetrate the Yangzi barrier, and there were fears that a military adventure in the south would benefit enemies in the north. Yet it is also likely that in the eyes of many northern leaders, southern China was not supposed to be conquered at all: the coexistence of northern and southern regimes might have been seen as a continuation of the bifurcation of power between the steppe and China proper, like that, for example, between the Han and the Xiongnu. Thus, despite their obvious military superiority, northern leaders did not allocate sufficient resources to conquer the south. It may be not incidental, therefore, that the two most serious efforts to attain true unification under the Northern Dynasties occurred under the rule of those leaders who were most deeply committed to Chinese political culture, namely, Fu Jian (338–385, r. 357–385) of the Former Qin (350–394) and Emperor