Free Spies and Commissars: The Bolshevik Revolution and the West by Robert Service Page B

which aimed to create communist parties abroad and destroy global capitalism. In 1920 they sent the Red Army itself into Poland. And although Lenin and Trotsky were disappointed when ‘the European revolution’ did not take place as they had expected, they remained convinced that their original gamble would end in triumph.
    I stumbled upon the idea for the book when looking at personal papers of the British intelligence agent Paul Dukes. His memoirs are an outstanding eyewitness account of conditions under early communist rule. Dukes on one of his spying missions enlisted with the Red Army and reported what he saw with the mind of an outsider. This led me to investigate other examples of reportage by foreigners, ranging from lively pro-Soviet cheerleaders like the newspaper correspondents John Reed and Arthur Ransome to the sombre attack on communism by Bertrand Russell in 1920. Then I found that the diplomats, too, had recorded many important things in their telegrams and autobiographies. This, I freely admit, was something of a surprise since I had shared the widespread idea that they were a rather slow-witted and incompetent bunch. From there it was only a short hop to investigating the entrepreneurs who lined up to restart the Russian trade in 1920–1. Such sources provide opportunity for a fresh insight into the history of communist Russia and supplementthe abundant documentation that has become available in Moscow in recent years. Russian history cannot be written satisfactorily on the basis of Russian archives alone.
    Other discoveries came to hand as this material was brought under scrutiny. I had taken it for granted that the Reds and the White Russians – and for that matter the Allies – knew rather little about each other. As Ethel Snowden first put it in 1920 on her visit to Petrograd and Moscow, an ‘iron curtain’ appeared to have been built along the frontiers of Russia. In fact the telegraphists, decoders and spies on every side did an effective job for their masters. Their activity filled large gaps in information by providing timely, accurate reports in the absence of conventional diplomacy after 1917. The Red Army was well informed about the White armies and vice versa. And although the White armies were separated from each other by huge distances, they could usually make contact through wireless messages. They were also helped by access to Soviet telegraph traffic which was intercepted by the British, French and Americans. The Reds lost a lot of Russia’s experts in communication and decryption who fled into obscurity or abroad soon after the October Revolution, but they increasingly made up for this failing. This was consequently a period when each side found out enough about the others to be able to formulate plans and policy on the basis of genuine knowledge – and the spies, telegraphists and decoders were as important in this process as the diplomats.
    No realistic calculus of military power in Europe favoured the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution. Their weak and ill-equipped Red Army would have stood no chance against the Germans if they had invaded Russia in 1918. Russia would have been equally vulnerable if the Western Allies had concerted an all-out invasion in the years that immediately followed. The communists were fortunate that external factors inhibited foreign great powers from marching into east-central Europe and overthrowing the revolutionary state. They were equally lucky that states abroad increasingly found it advantageous to end Russia’s economic isolation: trade treaties were signed first with Estonia and Scandinavia in 1920 and then with the United Kingdom in the following year.
    When the communists led by Lenin and Trotsky took power in Petrograd, they could not be certain that their government would last more than a few days. But this did not dent their optimism. If the Russians could so easily cast down capitalism, it would surely not belong before others did the