Free Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe by Ian Castle Page B

convincing destruction of Ferdinand’s calculations, suggesting that Napoleon could only bring a maximum of 70,000 to the Rhine, with great numbers tied up on the coast, in Paris, or confined to hospitals by various epidemics. Indeed, the very suggestion that 150,000 men could march from the Channel to Munich in the time span suggested by Ferdinand seemed highly unlikely to a man of Mack’s experience. Eloquent, persuasive, and backed by Cobenzl, Mack, won the kaiser over: consequently, the army would move into Bavaria.
    But Anton Mayer, chief of staff to Ferdinand’s Danube army, argued that while Charles’ plan to attack through Italy was the correct one, when Napoleon did eventually move, the Danube was his most likely target. Mayer had already become frustrated in his dealings with Mack, who had failed to provide him with a plan for the campaign in Bavaria. Mayer turned to Charles for help. Later, however, on 5 September, Mayer gained support for the redirection of some 30,000 troops, earmarked for Italy, to march for the Upper Danube instead. Despite his objections, Charles, with his influence much undermined, was forced to concede. No doubt much to Mack’s delight, the kaiser approved this transfer of manpower. The army on the Danube now increased to 72,000 men, on a par with Mack’s estimate of the strength Napoleon could bring to this theatre.
    Until the arrival of the Russians there was no need for the kaiser to join the army, so he remained in Vienna, as did both Charles and Ferdinand, prior to taking over their commands personally. Mack, however, as the kaiser’s representative, had already issued orders on 2 September for the army to assemble at Wels, in preparation for the march on the Inn, two days later. Mack’s presence with the army made Mayer’s position difficult, even before it became known that Mack carried secret orders authorising him to override Ferdinand’s decisions. As it was, Ferdinand did not join the army until 19 September, allowing Mack plenty of time to stamp his authority over Mayer.
    Karl Mack, Freiherr von Leiberich’s path to power had been unusual. Unlike the majority of senior military men in the Austrian army, who owed their rank to the fortune of high birth, Mack enrolled in the army in 1770 as an eighteen-year-old cavalry trooper. Although the son of a minor Protestant official, Mackgained his introduction to the Catholic-dominated army through an uncle on his mother’s side of the family, who served as a hauptmann in the 2. Karabinierregiment. Mack found army life agreeable and eighteen months later earned his first promotion, to the rank of korporal . Further promotions followed until in 1777, after excelling in the role of regimental adjutant – a position held by a senior NCO in the Austrian army – he gained his reward, a commission in the regiment, as unterleutnant . Mack’s big break came the following year when chosen to act as secretary to Feldmarschall Lacy, the honorary colonel of the regiment, on an inspection tour of the Bohemian border. He continued to serve Lacy through the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–79) and impressed everyone with his energy and devotion to duty. This taste of command outside the regimental structure appealed to Mack, so in 1783, with the rank of rittmeister (cavalry captain), he transferred to the Quartermaster General staff. He continued to earn high praise, gaining further promotion and in 1788 came an appointment as ADC to Kaiser Joseph II.
    Mack’s star continued in its ascendancy in the following years. In 1789, while serving against the Turks, he gained promotion to oberstleutnant but crossed swords with the aged Feldmarschall Laudon, one of the great eighteenth century Austrian generals, while serving under him at the Siege of Belgrade. Mack earned himself a severe reprimand: but after his successful attack on the Turkish-held city, he was promoted to oberst , and was awarded the Order of Maria Theresa and the title