Free Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography by Charles Moore Page A

combined with the damage done to newspapers by trade union practices, made the press far more hostile to Labour than it would otherwise have been, and more keen to lead the charge for Mrs Thatcher. In February 1981, Rupert Murdoch, who already owned the
Sun
and the
News of the World
, bid to buy
The Times
and the
Sunday Times
, a takeover which John Biffen, the minister responsible, eventually approved. Until that time,
The Times
and the
Sunday Times
had become increasingly disenchanted with Mrs Thatcher. But once Murdoch gained full control, until almost the end of her time in office, she was supported by his papers, as well as by Rothermere’s Associated Newspapers, the Telegraph group and Express Newspapers. This assisted her enormously. Comment in later years has suggested that it was controversial or underhand of Biffen not to refer the purchase to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. This is not the case, because
The Times
was loss-making, and the vendors and senior editorial staff welcomed the sale to Murdoch. What is true, however, is that Mrs Thatcher entertained Murdoch to lunch at Chequers on 4 January 1981 to discuss the bid. The official record (B. Ingham, Note for the Record, 4 Jan. 1981, Margaret Thatcher Foundation) does not indicate that she formally agreed to support him, but it is fair to assume that, informally, she did. As Murdoch put it, ‘Probably because of the political stance of the
Sun
, she knew where I stood. I’m sure Biffen must have got instructions or just read the tea-leaves’ (interview with Rupert Murdoch).

* A theory has grown up that adopting this language was the culmination of a State Department ploy to outmanoeuvre the Pentagon, in which Mrs Thatcher was complicit (see Richard Aldous,
Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship
, W. W. Norton, 2012, p. 41, and Geoffrey Smith,
Reagan and Thatcher
, Bodley Head, 1990, p. 48). This does not seem to have been the case. Both Richard Allen and the NSC staffer involved, James Rentschler, denied it outright. British officials have no memory of the incident, Mrs Thatcher never made this claim and the official papers do not support it. Mrs Thatcher’s view was known, but there is no evidence that she colluded with the State Department to shift Reagan’s position.

* In his biography of Mrs Thatcher, John Campbell asserts that in an effort to win over the doubters the Cabinet were treated to a two-hour presentation on the merits of D-5 by the MOD official Michael Quinlan (John Campbell,
Margaret Thatcher
, 2 vols, Jonathan Cape, 2000, 2003, vol. ii:
The Iron Lady
, p. 187). This is not the case. According to the late Sir Michael Quinlan this presentation did not take place. He had, in fact, left the MOD earlier. (Interview with Sir Michael Quinlan.)

* After Haig had offered the invitation via Nicko Henderson, Judge Clark sought, unsuccessfully, to withdraw it (Nicholas Henderson,
Mandarin:
The Diaries of an Ambassador, 1969–1982
, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995, pp. 477–9). Clark cited scheduling difficulties, but having just persuaded Reagan to extend the sanctions he may have been disinclined to expose the President to Mrs Thatcher’s objections. Haig, of course, had the opposite motive.

* Unknown to Mrs Thatcher and indeed to everyone else involved with the pipeline outside a tiny circle of Reagan advisers, the CIA had managed to insert a bug into the software the Soviets had acquired to operate the pipeline. According to Thomas Reed, then an NSC staffer, when this faulty software eventually came online US satellites detected ‘the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space’ deep within the Soviet Union. (Thomas C. Reed,
At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War
, Presidio Press, 2004, p. 269.) Knowledge of this capability may also have played some role in Reagan’s decision to lift the sanctions.

* Following the release of the state papers in 2011, the McCreesh family said that ‘the