Free The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries by Campbell Alastair Page B

to TB and we agreed Blunkett should lead on the issue. JP came to see me later, concerned he had not been visible, but there was going to be plenty of deputising work to be done, for example CHOGM [Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting] if TB didn’t go. TB was talking to Sharon, [Syrian President Bashar al-] Assad and later giving a polite bollocking to Jack. He then spoke to [Junichiro] Koizumi [Japanese Prime Minister] before he did a doorstep with the main political editors out on the terrace overlooking the garden. He was on form, strong on the Taliban and good on the humanitarian too. I did a background briefing for the broadcasters. We were having to chop and change his diary the whole time.
Wednesday, September 26
    Jack called from Israel, convinced that we were briefing against him and that the idea of Number 10 charging in to rescue ministers was bad for everyone. I think I managed to assure him that we weren’t, and he accepted there had been a fuck-up but wanted me to make it more clear that Sharon called TB, not the other way round, and that there had been no question of him having to apologise. Jack and I usually managed to straighten things. TB had done a draft outline for conference and we were now into pre-speech mode, what was the argument, what was the idea, what was the narrative. I really liked the power of community as a force for change at home and abroad. I was getting more alarmed about the lack of civil contingencies planning.
    I had a meeting with heads of information [Civil Service communications chiefs], did my usual spiel about the need for co-ordination, did a Q&A, but it was pretty clear we were going to need to strengthen things again. The MoD and the FCO were basically OK, though the FCO had a real problem with gabbiness, everyone thinking they needed to get their own point across to the press. Within two hours,the
Guardian
had been briefed on the meeting and what I had said to them. TB spoke to Major and Thatcher, thought there may be a role for Major in this. He said Thatcher had totally gone off on one, said ‘the English-speaking peoples’ would have to win this despite the weakness of the continental mainland. ‘We will win this like you and I defeated socialism, she said.’ TB replied he would have to give her exclusive credit for that.
Thursday, September 27
    Sixteen days on, after all the bellicose talk, there was still no sign of US action. Bush was leading the news with talk of tougher airline security. Our main story was going to be TB’s meeting with Muslim leaders. The press had been complaining about lack of access and with Philip’s note saying that TB was being seen by the public as ‘a rock’, and calling for him to be more not less visible, we agreed that he should do a press conference. He was worrying about Clare. I was trying to get her to do something publicly on the humanitarian front, possibly on the lines of building a humanitarian coalition alongside the military coalition. I worked on TB’s script – not a war on Islam, humanitarian coalition, domestic work goes on. There was some polling showing quite a dip in economic optimism. Julian [Braithwaite, press officer] was due off next week on a management course which was bad news because he was generating some terrific stuff on the anti-OBL front.
    TB’s meeting with the Muslim leaders went pretty well and his message was clear at the press conference. Then a somewhat alarming meeting with the defence chiefs and the spooks. It was pretty clear the US remained undecided, could not find that many good targets, and didn’t have the bases in the region. Hoon said there was a lack of clarity which made it difficult to plan. TB was getting a bit alarmed that the Yanks didn’t seem to get why they needed better co-ordination. TB said we needed joint planning cells, not just with the military, but the political and the propaganda, and we needed something similar with Europeans. Equally, the humanitarian