Free The Forgotten Spy by Nick Barratt Page B

still falling heavily, the sodden men under the cover of complete darkness slowly made their way towards their positions and formed up into their attack deployment, as ordered by the officers who were struggling to read their papers in the dark and wet. To maintain the element of surprise, British artillery did not clear the German lines with an advance barrage. Instead, at 5.20 am prompt – zero hour – a creeping barrage was laid down, behind which the first British troopswere given the signal to advance, stumbling forward amidst the falling shells and rain.
    The King’s Shropshire Light Infantry were part of the second wave and received their orders to attack at 7.00 am, but visibility was extremely poor on account of a very heavy mist which obscured Badger Copse, their target landmark. Because the 2nd York and Lancaster Battalion had failed to take their own objectives in the first wave of attacks, the advancing troops encountered heavy German machine-gun fire from Fresnoy le Petit on their right, which pinned them down for most of the morning. The war diary records that ‘the fighting grew very bitter’ 55 and the operational instructions no longer bore any semblance to the reality of the situation. The composite battalions within the brigade were mixed up and by 10.30 am the battalion HQ was forced to move forward to try to sort out the mess, since orders on the ground were no longer effective.
    With no further objectives gained throughout the day, the commanding officers held a conference at 5.00 pm and decided to consolidate their position. The attack had not succeeded so a decision was reached to try again the following morning. The unit war diary hints at the reaction of the field officers when they heard the news, as well as the appalling conditions they were working under.
    Without warning, brigade operation orders were received at 1.30 am at the new battalion HQ at Trout Copse to attack Fresnoy le Petit at 5.30 am. Great difficulty presented itself in writing battalion operation orders owing to no lights being possible, however those were written in the bottom of a trench and despatched about 3.00 am. Casualties to runners prevented them being received by the officer commanding D (support) Company and officers commanding front line companies found great difficulty in reading them before dawn. 56
    Tired officers, with no preparation and only a tentative grasp of what was intended, then issued the orders to assemble once more and face the enemy.As before, heavy machine-gun fire came from the right flank, but this time the objective was to take those positions.
    B Company fought its way into Fresnoy le Petit, meeting stubborn resistance, including the two remaining officers and entirely losing touch with the remainder of the battalion. Throughout the day the several small parties of which the company was now composed resisted all attempts of the enemy to surround them. 57
    Their gallantry was in vain, however:
    At dusk, being still isolated, these parties withdrew, still fighting, onto our line of posts. 58
    Oldham had been involved in the first stage of the assault. Under the German bombardment that accompanied the British advance, a shell exploded near his position. The blast knocked him unconscious and he was buried under the mud and debris thrown up by the explosion. He was dragged out by his men, still unconscious, and immediately taken to a first-aid post and then transferred to the nearest casualty clearing station for assessment, where he regained consciousness. Despite having no obvious physical injuries, he was clearly concussed and in no fit state to return to his unit, continuing to vomit and suffering from crippling headaches. 59
    He was moved to a field hospital on 20 September and three days later was sent home from Le Havre, arriving in Southampton on the morning of 24 September. While recuperating, he contracted flu on 8 October – possibly a mild strain of the deadly swine or Spanish flu which