Free The Angel by Uri Bar-Joseph Page B

lacking in scruples, a demagogue and a hypocrite; seen as a boor, talentless and incapable of making his own contribution to the conduct of policy.” Shamir’s assessment concluded that “Sadat is not a personality with the skills needed to run a country. He lacks the basic qualifications to hold the reins of government in any real way, or to be accepted in Egypt as Nasser’s successor and a leader of the Arabs.” 3 Similar assessments were formulated by other intelligence agencies around the world, and some of them made their way to Israel as well.
    Some have argued that Sadat’s image as one of the least competent men in the Egyptian leadership was deliberately crafted. According to Anis Mansour, a veteran Egyptian journalist and a friend of Sadat’s, Nasser’s successor was in fact exceptionally clever and ambitious, much more so than was assumed. According to Mansour, Sadat understood that drawing too much attention to himself would risk creating the impression that he was trying to compete with Nasser and undermine his leadership. So he always kept a low profile, appearing as unthreatening as possible, the entire aim of which was to survive. If Mansour is right, Sadat’s strategy proved itself amply, because it was precisely that unthreatening image that earned him the vice presidency in 1969, a largely ceremonial post that only became truly important when Nasser suddenly died the following year.
    Regardless of whether Sadat’s weak image was deliberate, one can understand why men like Sabri, Gomaa, Sami Sharaf, and former vice president Hussein el-Shafei were initially willing to go along with a Sadat presidency. Such an arrangement offered two advantages. First, it would send a signal of continuity and constitutionality of the regime. And second, his political weakness would mean that he could pose little threat to their own status; theywould still be able to depose him when the time was right. He was not an especially popular figure in Egypt and had no independent power base. A common saying in Cairo at the time was that God had given Egypt two catastrophes: taking Nasser away and putting Sadat in his place. During a May Day celebration of 1971 held at a steel factory in the city of Helwan, Sadat gave the keynote address. Thousands of people chanted “Sadat! Sadat!”—while waving posters bearing Nasser’s picture.
    Sadat’s political weakness was also a function of the specific governmental structure that had come together under Nasser. It was the result of having a charismatic and powerful leader who knew how to speak directly to the masses but who still needed mechanisms of authority, oversight, and motivation for the Egyptian people. What emerged was a layer of second-tier leaders, about fifteen in all, who were close to Nasser and became known as the “centers of power” ( markaz al-kaw i ). Each of them was responsible for an area of operation—diplomacy, defense, infrastructure, party politics. And each built his power not so much on his connection to Nasser or his personal skills but on his ability to build and maintain a long train of loyal followers, known as a sheelah , or “comet tail.”
    As a result, these leaders often put a far greater emphasis on keeping their followers happy than on faithfully discharging their duties. And so, when Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer fell from grace in the wake of the Six-Day War, some people said that he had invested more in maintaining his military sheelah than in preparing for war. Similarly, the true loyalty of the vast networks of intelligence operatives run by Interior Minister Shaarawy Gomaa and presidential secretary Sami Sharaf was less to the security of the country and more to the two men in charge. Because Nasser’s personal leadership was so dominant throughout Egyptian life, his support among the population unrivaled, there was no fear ofcompetition between his status and that