Free I Signed My Death Warrant by Ryle T. Dwyer Page B

several reasons for not going. If Lloyd George tried the strong-arm tactics he used in July, the delegation could, he said, always use the necessity of consulting him as an excuse to prevent it being rushed into any hasty decisions. There were, however, much broader considerations.
    â€˜There seemed, in fact, at the time to be no good reason why I should be on the delegation,’ he later wrote. ‘There was, on the other hand, a host of good reasons why I should remain at home. One had, above all, to look ahead and provide for the outcome of the negotiations. They would end either in a “make” or “break” - in a settlement based on the accepted cabinet policy of External Association, or in a failure of the negotiations with a probable renewal of war. In either case I could best serve the national interest by remaining at home.
    â€˜If the outcome were to be the settlement we had envisaged, that based on External Association,’ he continued, ‘it was almost certain that it would be no easy task to get that settlement accepted wholeheartedly by the Dáil and by the Army.’ He had already got a taste of the kind of bitterness such a proposal could generate, not only from Brugha’s vitriolic outburst at the cabinet meeting on 25 July, but also in the United States during a controversy that erupted following an interview he gave the Westminster Gazette in January 1920. External Association was essentially a more developed version of the ideas he first propounded in that controversial interview.
    By not taking part in the negotiations, de Valera argued he would be in a better position to influence radical republicans to accept a compromise agreement. ‘My influence,’ he said, ‘would be vastly more effective if I myself were not a member of the nego­­tiating team, and so completely free of any suggestion that I had been affected by the “London atmosphere”.’
    Those negotiating would inevitably have to compromise, but even this might not be good enough in the last analysis. Consequently, by staying at home, he would be in a position to rally both moderates and radicals to fight for an absolute claim, instead of a less appealing compromise. ‘Were there to be a “break” with any substantial section of our people discontented and restless, the national position would be dangerously weakened when the war resumed. I was providing for this contingency much better by remaining at home than by leading the delegation.’
    Throughout the struggle his primary role within the movement at home was as a unifying figure. He had tried to be all things - a moderate among moderates and a radical among militants. He wished to maintain that role, so it made good sense not to get too involved in the nitty-gritty of the negotiations. Moreover, if the negotiations collapsed, de Valera would also be in a better position to initiate further contacts with the British, if he had not been involved in the conference. In the last analysis his decision to stay in Dublin was based on sound, though selfish, political grounds. He knew that those who went were likely to become scapegoats – with the radicals if they compromised, and with the moderates if they did not.
    â€˜We must have scapegoats,’ de Valera told his cabinet.
    Later in trying to justify his decision, he sought to rationalise his selfish considerations by cloaking them in the national interest. In the process he seemed to protest the merits of his own position a little too much. He contended, for instance, that by staying at home he could play his part ‘in keeping public opinion firm’ and also ‘in doing everything possible to have the Army well organised and strong.’
    â€˜Feeling ran pretty high here, the Black and Tans and Auxi­liaries were still amongst us,’ Barton noted. ‘The Republicans forces had to be kept together and consolidated, someone had to stay and