Free The Dictator's Learning Curve: Inside the Global Battle for Democracy by William J. Dobson Page A

flow of information, ideas, and conversation on that medium would be a good place to start.
    A few months earlier Medvedev had momentarily made waves for a manifesto he published that was highly critical of the regime as it existed. I was told that the Institute of Contemporary Development had been behind this initiative as well. In many ways, this article, titled “Russia Forward,” had previewed many of the ideas in the report that had brought me to speak to Evgeny Gontmakher. But what stood out to me was how the president’s reformist ideas were received. AlthoughRussian politicos parsed the president’s words, Russian state television was unimpressed. That night the news focused on a visit Putin paid to factory workers south of Moscow. Medvedev’s manifesto—a proposal by a country’s president to effectively remake the political system—was buried at the bottom of the broadcast. Gontmakher might be right that the effect of freeing TV in an authoritarian system such as Russia’s could be powerful, perhaps immediately so. But I wasn’t sure if it was a decision to be made by two people—or one.

“This Is Mubarak No. 2”
     
    From the moment Dmitri Medvedev became president, one question loomed over Russia: Would Putin return? For four years, journalists and modern Kremlinologists parsed both men’s speeches, statements, and rare public disagreements for signs of Medvedev’s growing independence or Putin’s nostalgia for the executive suite. Putin remained coy. He told Larry King that he and Medvedev would consult each other and “come to a decision.” In September 2010, when Putin was asked about his future political plans at the Valdai group, a meeting of foreign academics and Russia experts,he reminded those assembled that Franklin Roosevelt had served four terms as U.S. president. Speculation over who would step forward as United Russia’s candidate was confused by the fact that both men often acted as if they wanted the job.Putin’s thirteen-hundred-mile drive across Siberia in a Russian Lada (which supposedly broke down at least twice) looked like the opening gambit of a political campaign. For his part, Medvedev repeatedly said he was open to the idea of a second term. As late as the summer of 2011, he told the
Financial Times
, “Any leader who occupies a post such as president is simply obliged to want to run for [reelection].” It often seemed as if Medvedev were simply waiting for Putin to tell him if he could.
    A year and a half before the decision would be announced, I asked Nemtsov, the opposition leader, who he thought would become president in 2012. “I think the chance for Medvedev is 10 percent, and for Putin it is 90 percent,” he replied. When Medvedev became president in 2008, one of his early moves (with almost no public discussion) was to lengthen the presidential term of office from four to six years.That meant that if Putin were to return, he could serve another twelve years as president. This fact seemed to concern Nemtsov most. “The worst scenario for Russia is if Putin comes back,” he said. “This is terrible. It means that he will run the country for twenty-five years [in total]. This is Mubarak No. 2.”
    On September 24, 2011, at United Russia’s party congress, the speculation came to an end. Speaking to a packed hall of eleven thousand party members, Medvedev managed a slight smile when he said, “I think it would be correct for the congress to support the candidacy of the party chairman, Vladimir Putin, to the post of president of the country.” The hall instantly filled with applause as the crowd rose to its feet. In the new arrangement, the two men would simply swap roles, with Putin returning to the presidency and Medvedev going to the prime minister’s office. When Putin walked to the podium to address the crowd, he paused and tapped the microphone. It appeared to be malfunctioning. Then, making light of it, he told the assembled party faithful it