Free One False Step by Richard Tongue Page A

boosters in the world, completing its 300 th launch in 2003, gaining this reliability took time and resources.
     If the Proton would prove difficult to tame, then the N-1 proved several orders of magnitude harder. Though some early designs date back to 1956, the missile had no evident military applications and hence languished in development hell for years; it was not until 1960 that the Soviet government decided that the development of a booster of this type could have uses, and authorised it's creation. The goal, implicitly, was a familiar one – a manned flight to Mars.
     Based on the drive of the people involved, and the skill demonstrated in carrying out these goals, it almost seems that opting to race the Americans to the Moon was a grievous tactical error. Sending men to Mars was probably an attainable feat; some historians have even suggested that this could have been carried out by the end of the decade; while this seems unlikely, certainly within the 1970s an attempt could have been made, had the moon been bypassed and a focus retained on a different primary goal for the required length of time.
     Even after it gained approval, the N-1 rocket made only slow progress. One breakthrough came with the engine design; after rejecting a wide variety of existing designs, Korolev commissioned the creation of a new one, by a bureau under a plane-maker named Nikolai Kuznetsov, who had no previous experience with engine design. It must have been beginner's luck, for he came up with a design that is still regarded today as ground-breaking, in terms of both performance and cost; it is flying today in the second stage of the Indian GSLV launch vehicle.
     When the N-1 was designated as the primary vehicle for landing on the moon, again a series of problems had to be overcome. The payload weight had already been increased to 75 tonnes, but this was still insufficient for the planned lunar mission. Attempts were made to increase the weight, and a number of sacrifices to the flight – reducing the crew to two being a prime example – were accepted. The N-1 would be one of the most technically advanced rockets in the world when it finally flew, even more advanced in some ways than the Saturn V.
     Just as the N-1 finally seemed to be gaining the momentum it would need if NASA could be caught, a major disaster hit the Soviet space program – Sergei Korolev, it's driving force, died. His health had been shattered by time spent in the gulags, and he had never fully recovered. Years later, many in the Soviet space effort claimed that had he lived, they would have beaten the Americans to the moon after all; such was the effect he had on the program.
     The rival bureaux again lined up to try and usurp control. Chelomei tried again to take control of the Soviet space program, but was narrowly beaten by Vasili Mishin, Korolev's former deputy. Although he had Korolev's job, he never had the same level of prestige his predecessor had, and he would eventually be replaced in 1974, long after the race had been lost.
     Further setbacks were to follow in short order. The intended cornerstone of the Soviet manned space program, including the lunar program, was to be the Soyuz capsule, a Korolev design for a highly adaptable spaceship, with variants capable of flying Earth-orbital missions, operating with space stations, and flying to the Moon. This capsule is still flying today, indeed it is now the primary personnel transport to the International Space Station. In 1967, however, it was still brand new. Still untested, and still highly experimental.
     It had already been delayed for some years when the decision was taken to test it. It had already been delayed considerably; early plans had called for a 1964 lunar flyby. One of the most experienced cosmonauts, Vladimir Komorov, was selected to pilot it; though it could carry a crew of three, for this first test it would only carry a single man. The flight was a disaster from the