Free Beyond Peace by Richard Nixon Page A

force to put down the reactionary mob that rampaged through Moscow in October 1993. In the process he taught a lesson to those who resort to arms rather than votes in a democracy.
    Some observers make the fatuous argument that Yeltsin demonstrated a disregard for law by not following the provisions of the Soviet-era Russian constitution and by dissolving the Gorbachev-era Congress of People’s Deputies. To his credit, despite the fundamental flaws of the Soviet-era constitution, he did not disregard it lightly. Only after a great deal of hesitation did he come to the conclusion that the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Parliament had become intractable roadblocks not only to reform but also to responsible government.
    Other leaders might have handled the difficult relationship with the Congress of People’s Deputies in a less confrontational manner. I myself urged that he do so when we met in Moscow in February 1993. But he turned out to be right. Within certain reasonable limits, leaders should do what is natural for them. Each must find his or her own way to deal with challenges. Winston Churchill, Charles de Gaulle, and Ronald Reagan were all effective in serving their nations. Yet they had different styles and used different methods to accomplish their objectives. The product of a unique period in Russian history, Yeltsin cannot be judged as if he were the president of a stable democracy with an established constitutional order. If he acted like one, he would probably fail.
    We should learn from history. This is the second experiment with a Russian transition to democracy. In 1917, the Provisional Government under Kerensky tried to adhere to strictdemocratic standards. It failed to develop close ties with the military and continued to fulfill its obligations to the allies to pursue the war with Germany, despite Russia’s desperate situation. The outcome was the Bolshevik takeover and more than seven decades of communist dictatorship. The United States does not need another Kerensky at Russia’s helm at this moment of trial. It is shortsighted of Yeltsin’s Western critics to attack him for precisely the kind of conduct that makes him an effective leader under these extraordinary circumstances. And it is hypocritical of them to be less patient with him and his fellow reformers after barely a year of dramatic progress than they were with Gorbachev after six years of timid incrementalism and broken promises.
    Now that a new constitution has been adopted and a new Parliament democratically elected, the charges against Yeltsin have become moot. In view of the massive problems he confronts, Russia is fortunate that he has not been more authoritarian in trying to implement his reforms.
    To evaluate Yeltsin, it is useful to compare him with Gorbachev. Gorbachev should be remembered as a great leader in Russian history. His political reforms made Yeltsin possible. Yeltsin, on the other hand, holds Gorbachev’s place in history in his hands as he tries to implement the economic reforms Gorbachev was unwilling and unable to carry through.
    Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin had history working against them. Generally, good revolutionary leaders are not good nation builders. Revolutionary leaders must destroy the old institutions. Nation builders must create new ones. Two leaders as different as George Washington in the United States and Jawaharlal Nehru in India were able to be both good revolutionary leaders and nation builders. Gorbachev failed that test. Now Yeltsin must demonstrate that he can succeed where Gorbachev failed.
    Both began their careers as peasants. Gorbachev became a man of the world. Yeltsin remained a man of the people. Thishas proved to be his major source of strength in the crises he has confronted as Russia’s President. When I saw him in 1992, I told him that as he traveled around the world, it was far better for him to be seen tipping glasses with a peasant than with a