Thrace and was soon on the march. Although resistance was sometimes fierce, he was able to push as far west as the borders of Macedonia, which offered earth and water to the Persian king. 5
That such a substantial Persian force still existed in Thrace is an indication that the Persian defeat north of the Danube was not as catastrophic as many historians have previously reported. However, it is also likely that the empire did not have any substantial forces in reserve for other duties, as it was at least two years before Megabazos’s replacement, Otanes, could be sent with reinforcements to crush the revolts in Byzantium, Chalcedon, and other nearby Greek cities.
In the meantime, Darius had been rewarding those who had done himgreat service during the expedition. Among them was Histiaios, whom Darius credited with holding the bridgehead at the Danube for him. 6 When asked what he wanted as a reward, Histiaios requested and was granted the lands of Myrkinos in southern Thrace. As Megabazos was returning to Sardis with a portion of his army, he passed through this area and took careful note of the abundance of lumber-rich forests and silver mines in the region. He may also have noted Myrkinos’s strong strategic position, as it was the key to control of the north Aegean islands and sat along all of the major east–west trade routes, including those leading to the gold-laden interior. Upon reaching Darius, he informed the king that Histiaios, once entrenched in this position, might make himself powerful enough to become a threat or at least a major inconvenience to the empire. Convinced, Darius sent for Histiaios and carted him off to Susa in gilded captivity as a royal adviser.
For at least the next decade, the mists of history enshroud events within the Persian Empire. We can assume that Darius presented his invasion of Thrace as a great success and returned his attention to consolidating his hold on power. Moreover, we know that Otanes was busy crushing revolts and bringing order to the northern frontier, which would keep the army occupied and distracted from mischief for most of this time. Beyond that, very little is known.
But stresses were building in certain portions of the empire, and in 499 BC, they boiled over in Ionia. Moreover, when the Ionians appealed to their brother Greeks to come to their aid against the Persians, the Athenians were quick to answer the call.
PART IV
WAYS OF WAR
Chapter 14
PERSIAN WARFARE
M esopotamia was more than the “cradle of civilization.” It was also the “cradle of war.” From the moment humans first settled into organized communities, civilization and warfare have found themselves inextricably entwined. Along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, great empires rose and fell based on the fortunes of battle and the tides of war. Unfortunately, most of the tales of these three millennia of unrelenting carnage have disappeared into the mists of history. But despite all that has vanished, the story of one empire still reaches across the chasm of three thousand years as the embodiment of what can be built through a policy of blood and iron and maintained through war and savage cruelty—Assyria. 1
Even at the zenith of its power, with all of the great Mesopotamian states under its dominion, Assyria remained continuously at war either against new threats on its expanding frontiers or putting down revolts among the restless people within its empire. Between 900 and 650 BC, the height of Assyrian power, the empire engaged in no fewer than 108 conflicts as well as innumerable punitive expeditions against neighboring peoples and to punish for internal revolts. 2 Their brutal method of warfare is best described by their own words. King Sennacherib (704–681 BC) describes a battle with the Elamites in 691 BC:
At the command of the god Ashur, the great Lord, I rushed upon the enemy like the approach of a hurricane.… I put them to rout and turned them back. I transfixed the troops of the
Dean Wesley Smith, Kristine Kathryn Rusch
Martin A. Lee, Bruce Shlain