where SF has an influence. It helps people to visualize alternate realities, to understand that
things donât have to stay the same.
One dramatic lesson we draw from SF simulations is that the most wide-ranging and extreme alterations can result from seemingly small changes. In general, societyâs coupled computations tend to produce events whose sizes have an unlimited range. This means that, inevitably, very large cataclysms will occasionally occur. Society is always in a gnarly state, which the writer Mark Buchanan refers to as âupheavableâ in
Ubiquity: The Science of History ⦠or Why the World Is Simpler Than You Think
(Crown, 2000 New York), 231-33.
Buchanan draws some conclusions about the flow of history that dovetail nicely with the notion of gnarly computation:
History could in principle be like the growth of a tree, and follow a simple progression toward some mature and stable end point, as both Hegel and Karl Marx thought. In this case, wars and other tumultuous social events should grow less and less frequent as humanity approaches the stable society at the End of History. Or history might be like the movement of the Moon around the Earth, and be cyclic, as the historian Arnold Toynbee once suggested. He saw the rise and fall of civilizations as a process destined to repeat itself with regularity. Some economists believe they see regular cycles in economic activity, and a few political scientists suspect that such cycles drive a correspondingly regular rhythm in the outbreak of wars. Of course, history might instead be completely random, and present no perceptible patterns whatsoever â¦
But this list is incomplete ⦠The [gnarly] critical state bridges the conceptual gap between the regularand the random. The pattern of change to which it leads through its rise of factions and wild fluctuations is neither truly random nor easily predictedâ¦. It does not seem normal and lawlike for long periods of calm to be suddenly and sporadically shattered by cataclysm, and yet it is. This is, it seems, the ubiquitous character of the world.
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In his
Foundation
series, Isaac Asimov depicts a universe in which the future is to some extent regular and predictable, rather than being gnarly. His mathematician character Hari Seldon has created a technique called âpsy-chohistoryâ that allows him to foretell the large-scale motions of society. This is fine for an SF series, but in the real world, it seems not to be possible.
One of the more intriguing observations regarding history is that, from time to time a society seems to undergo a sea change, a discontinuity, a revolutionâ think of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, the Sixties, or the coming of the Web. In these rare cases it appears as if the underlying rules of the system have changed.
Although the day-to-day progress of the system may be in any case unpredictable, thereâs a limited range of possible values that the system actually hits. In the interesting cases, these possible values lie on a fractal shape in some higher-dimensional space of possibilitiesâthis shape is what chaos theory calls a strange attractor.
Looking at the surf near a spit at the beach, youâll notice that certain water patterns recur over and overâ perhaps a double-crowned wave on the right, perhaps a bubbling pool of surge beside the rock, perhaps a high-flown spray of spume off the front of the rock. This rangeof patterns is a strange attractor. When the tide is lower or the wind is different, the waves will run through a different repertoireâtheyâll be moving on a different strange attractor.
During any given historical period, a society has a kind of strange attractor. A limited number of factions fight over power, a limited number of social roles are available for the citizens, a limited range of ideas are in the air. And then, suddenly, everything changes, and after the change
Gina Whitney, Leddy Harper