Free Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program by Glynn S. Lunney Page A

failing system. This learning stage was often made apparent by the admonition, “Yes, but after all those preliminaries, what do you want me (or the crew) to do?” Since we had all been there, we recognized the clarity on the final recommendation being sought, and the implied rebuke to the stall tactic. By the way, this constant need for clarity in discussions, decisions, et cetera probably inhibited the already meager poetic in us and, I would guess, frustrated the interviewers who were always trying, properly so, to evoke some expression of feeling and/or emotion from us.
    The benefit of the impassioned debates over the mission rules was real and enduring. The discussions forced out all aspects of any applicable considerations and there were always champions for more or less risk or response to each of all the failures under consideration. It was not apparent at first but after months of this, we began to be able to generalize what was evolving. For example, we wanted enough redundancy so that we could still tolerate one more specific failure and still recover the crew safely. In the early days, these were aimed at deciding the redundancy levels necessary to continue on-orbit, or conversely to terminate the mission early. As these rules were tested in the integrated simulations with the crew in the simulator and the MCC, they eventually became, in essence, a code of ethics that defined the risk-reward tradeoff. All of the operators and the crews gradually came together on a deep understanding of our compact with each other as to how we would manage risk. It was the process of going through each and every postulated condition and response, and testing of that framework in simulations that built the team confidence. The payoff is in invoking the familiar thought and judgment process when something outside the mission rules discussions occurs. And the unexamined conditions did happen. In those cases, we got to an answer consistent with our risk-reward framework.
    The understanding that the team created was sometimes underappreciated. There were several occasions in the future when a compulsion to manage and be the decision maker would infect people. This usually showed up as HQ people attempting to inject themselves into operational decisions. It is probably a common disease, but, in these cases, they skipped all the prior steps that created a common understanding of the risk-reward trade. They probably viewed it as more of a prerogative matter and less as a culmination of the invention and training process. The foray never lasted long enough before correction so that it never did any harm, but it could have. Some incidents were testy and there will be more on some of those later.
    Chris relished the give-and-take, the arguments, the new insights from our flight experience and all the other factors informing us of ways to improve the rules and the process. A favorite of Chris’s was the simulation (sim) ordeal. After each sim, there was always a debriefing – what was done well or badly and why. These sims were a baptism by fire – the palms always got sweaty; any decision had to be justified, and one’s honor was at stake, naked in front of his peers and the boss. And, most all of us spent some time in that naked position. But, it did raise one’s determination to avoid screwing up. These screw-ups were also the feedstock for ridicule afterward at every opportunity. Sympathy and propriety norms were uncommon. We had adult leadership role models all around us. Another of those, mentioned earlier, was Tecwyn “Tec” Roberts. Tec came by way of Canada and the AVRO windfall to STG. Originally from the country of Wales, he was raised in the small town of Trefnant Bach, Llanddaniel. He was the branch chief and leader of the Mission Control Center branch. He was about ten years older than the rest of us in the unit. But he patiently required our boisterous opinions to be backed up and reinforced by well-studied background,