Free Electromagnetic Pulse by Bobby Akart Page A

devastating retaliatory response. Such an attack against the United States would inherently and conclusively represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland, and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any country or terrorist group contemplating a HEMP attack, would have to assume that a reprisal would be full, swift, and devastating. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP, as somehow less hostile than the utilization of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city, is not something a country is likely to gamble on.
    Countries that build HEMP weapons invest vast amounts of capital in their nuclear programs. A successful nuclear weapons program is the product of decades of scientific research and development. U.S. nuclear weapons are maintained as a deterrent to an attack, not with the intention of using them offensively. Over the years, the U.S. has achieved an initial first-strike capability. The focus of the Department of Defense is to establish a survivable deterrent that can withstand first, a conventional, and then, a nuclear first strike. Under this policy, the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent, and then a means of counter-attack.
    It is comforting to know that the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, still govern themselves by the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine. The principles of nuclear deterrence, and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike, continue to hold and govern post-Cold War.
    The Threat from Rogue Actors
    One of the scenarios that concern Washington is that the EMP threat stems from a rogue state or a terrorist group like ISIS that does not possess ICBMs, but who will use deception to accomplish its mission. A rogue state, like North Korea or Iran, or even a terrorist group, could load a nuclear warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker. The missile could be launched from our coastal waters, placing the warhead in position for a targeted HEMP strike. This scenario, without leaving any fingerprints, would involve either a short-range ballistic missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range—but not necessarily intercontinental—ballistic missile to reach the necessary position over the central U.S. to deliver a continental strike.
    This threat scenario faces the same obstacles as any other potential nuclear weapon employed in a terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or Hezbollah can develop a nuclear weapons program. Their organizations do not have the requisite financial or personnel resources to do soit.
    It is also highly unlikely that a nation like Iran or North Korea, who have devoted significant resources to developing a nuclear weapon, would entrust such a weapon to an outside terrorist organization. There have been great strides made in the last decade in the field of nuclear forensics. The use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously investigated, and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified.
    A group like ISIS, however, would likely use a nuclear device, if it could obtain one. The risk of a terrorist group acquiring a nuclear capability of any kind, crude or sophisticated is possible, but not likely. Here’s why:
    The development of a HEMP nuclear weapon requires significant financial resources, scientific talent, and time. An attack scenario from a rogue actor requires a sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead.
    The engineering expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that needed to build a radio frequency weapon, for example. A warhead must be far more compact than a simple device. It must