Free Bartleby the Scrivener by Herman Melville Page B

objects of desire, in different degrees, according to the experience of their different qualities, their wholesomeness, the pleasure they give to his taste, and various other considerations. As the
desirableness
, in this case, is complex, and the impression that each circumstance belonging to it makes upon the mind is also various, depending upon the momentary state of it, the presence or absence of other ideas, etc. it is possible that the comparative desirableness of the two fruits may vary much in a short space of time, sometimes the one and sometimes the other having the ascendant. But, provided the man were obliged to make a choice at any one moment of time, it will not be denied, that he would certainly choose that which appeared to him, for that moment, the more desirable. If he were under no restraint whatever, it is possible that, on some accounts, he might choose to make no choice at all, and he might neglect both the kinds of fruit. But still it would be because that conduct appeared
more desirable
than the other,
i.e. preferable
to it.
    This, I will venture to say, is all that a man can possibly be
conscious of
, viz. that nothing hinders his choosing, or taking, whichever of the fruits appears to him more desirable, or his not making any choice at all, according as the one or the other shall appear to him preferable upon the whole. But there is always some
reason
for any object, or any conduct, appearing desirable or preferable; a reason existing either in a man’s own previous
disposition of mind
, or in his
idea of the things
proposed to him. In things of small consequence, or in a very quick succession ofideas, the reason may be forgotten, or even not explicitly attended to, but it did exist, and actually contributed to make the thing, or the conduct, appear desirable at the time.
    As this is all that any man can be conscious of with respect to himself, so it is all that he can observe with respect to others. Agreeably to this, whenever we either reflect upon our own conduct, or speculate concerning that of others, we never fail to consider, or ask, what could be the
motive
of such or such a choice; always taking for granted that there must have been some motive or other for it; and we never suppose, in such cases, that any choice could be made without some motive, some
apparent reason
, or other.
    When it is said that a man acts from
mere will
(though this is not common language) the word is never used in a strict metaphysical sense, or for will under the influence of no motive; but the meaning is, that in such a case a man acts from
willfulness
, or
obstinacy
, i.e. to resist the control of others; the motive being to
show his liberty, and independence
, which is far from being a case in which a man is supposed to act without any motive at all.
    The
consciousness of freedom
, therefore, is an ambiguous expression, and cannot prove any thing in favor of philosophical or metaphysical liberty; but, when rightly understood, appears to decide in favour of the doctrine of necessity, or the necessary influence of motives to determine the choice.
    —from The
Doctrine Of Philosophical Necessity
by
Joseph Priestley .
A friend of Benjamin Franklin and member of the Royal Society, Priestley (1733–1804) was a pioneering scientist, clergyman, political theorist and natural philosopher. As a scientist he is most famous for the invention of soda water, the discovery of oxygen and his pioneering work on electricity. His political writings on the role of dissent were influential in both the American and French Revolution. Born in England, Priestley’s radically new political opinions forced him to immigrate to the fledgling United States, where he lived the last ten years of his life
.
Herman Melville would prefer not to
    How shall a man go about refusing a man?—Best be roundabout, or plump on the mark?—I can not write the thing you want. I am in the humor to lend a hand to a friend, if I can;—but I am not in the