Free Combat Crew by John Comer Page A

predictions about daylight Fortress raids deep into Germany? The General, very likely, reached two conclusions: one, the Fortresses could battle their way to any target in Europe regardless of German all-out opposition; two, the Bombers must have long-range escort fighters to hold the losses to an acceptable figure when making deep thrusts to well-protected targets.
    The questions were: What fighters did we have that could go with the B-17s to distant targets? When could we get such fighters delivered to England? The proposed new modified P-51, with Rolls-Royce Merlin engines, was not released yet for full production. As far as we knew, the only other fighter with enough range was the P-38 Lightning. Was the P-38 a match for the excellent M.E. 109s and F.W. 190s? The P-38 was a good fighter, but not great, and I’m sure the General wanted something better. We, the bomber crews, knew nothing of Bomber Command’s urgent appeal for long-range escort. We would have slept better had we known how strenuously they were pleading with General Arnold, in Washington, for immediate help.
    After the Schweinfurt showdown the Colonel no longer had to exhort his experienced pilots to stay in tight formation. Those who got back had learned a lesson they would never forget. They saw what the Jerry fighters did to “throttle jocks.” There were a number of reasons why a tight formation was so essential to standing off German fighter attacks. A bomber could not concentrate much firepower against a fighter except on tail attacks. The Germans knew that, so they mainly hit with a frontal charge. A single Fortress could bring to bear only three guns on a head-on attack (the nose gun and the two top turret guns). The navigator could fire only if the attack was approaching at an angle to the nose. The top turret guns could not be brought down quite level, so a German fighter charging straight in at the nose could sometimes get under the trajectory of the turret, leaving only the Bombardier’s single gun to oppose him. (When the B-17G model was brought out in October of 1943 the single nose gun was replaced with two guns in a chin turret and the navigator side guns were eliminated.) That meant three fifty-caliber machine guns versus four twenty-millimeter cannon and two to four thirty-caliber machine guns — quite an unequal match-up if the fighter was opposed by only one B-17. (German fighters varied in the kind and amount of armament.) So the chief defense factor was a large number of guns from adjoining aircraft, exceeding the firepower of the attacker. The tighter the formation was, the more fire it could bring to bear against the enemy. Even so, the Bogies had armor plating protection around the engine and cockpit, which cut the chances of our fifty-caliber projectiles getting to the pilot and the most vulnerable parts of the aircraft.
    Attacks from the rear were infrequent because very early the Jerries learned that to attack a B-17 from the rear was not the way to remain alive and healthy. First, the lethal tail guns were assisted by the top turret, the ball turret, and sometimes the radio gun. Second, the fighters overtaking the bombers had a slow rate of closure. That meant the B-17 guns could begin firing at one thousand yards and do a lot of damage before the Germans got close enough to fire their cannon, which had a shorter range of six hundred yards. Thus, a tight formation was the ultimate defensive tactic of a bomber force beyond the range of fighter escort.
    That night Jim said to me, “Do you remember that time when we were flying alone over the mountains and number-one engine burst into flame?”
    â€œSure, I remember it. We didn’t know enough to realize it was highly dangerous. We know now.”
    â€œIf it happened tomorrow the whole crew would be rushing to the nearest escape hatch.”
    That incident did not disturb us a bit. Herb calmly retarded the throttle, then opened it up and sucked