that Athens no longer needed to invoke
the glorious precedents of the past in order to celebrate the battles of the present:
in a kind of prefiguration of the quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, the
city now presented itself as a model for others to follow, not simply an imitator.
Those were not the only criticisms leveled at Pericles where military matters were
concerned. His opponents also blamed him for having sometimes prevented his political
rivals from fighting in the best of conditions, even to the point of endangering the
whole city. For example, he was said to have forbidden Cimon to take part in the battle
of Tanagra, in 457, in order to prevent this troublesome rival from returning to favor.
Cimon, the hero of Eurymedon, who had been living in exile for five years, had on
this occasion hoped to reintegrate himself into the Athenian forces and thereby prove
his devotion to his country, which was then at war with the Spartans. Having obstructed
him, Pericles was obliged to show exceptional heroism himself, so as to wipe out the
memory of the services offered by his rival: “For which reason, it is thought, Pericles
fought most sturdily in that battle and was the most conspicuous of all in exposing
himself to danger.” 28
In similar fashion, Pericles is said to have done his utmost to prevent Cimon’s son,
Lakedaimonius, from covering himself with glory in battle. According to Stesimbrotus
of Thasos, in 433 B.C. Pericles sent Lakedaimonius to assist Corcyra, which was then
in difficulty, facing Corinthian interference, but Pericles provided him with only
10 triremes, thereby rendering his task impossible. 29
So was Pericles simply a sordid manipulator, striving to belittle the merits of his
rivals in order to magnify his own and to be the only one to tread the paths of glory?
We should beware of drawing overhasty conclusions that are based solely on a reading
of Plutarch. In the first place, Lakedaimonius was not the only stratēgos sent on this mission to Corcyra: Cimon’s son was accompanied by two of his colleagues,
as is attested both by Thucydides and by an inscription recording the expenses devoted
to this venture. 30 Furthermore, it was the people of Athens who decided on the despatch of these stratēgoi , not Pericles himself. The fact nevertheless remains that, in a context of perpetual
rivalry between political and military leaders such as this, it was in each leader’s
interest to see that his rivals basked in as little glory as possible on the battlefields.
There was yet another, even more radical criticism that Pericles had to face. Throughout
his career, the stratēgos favored a way of waging war that broke radically with the traditional customs and
codes. Whenever possible, he triedto avoid fighting, thereby sometimes attracting accusations of cowardice or even treachery
from opponents who found themselves short of arguments.
A R EFLECTIVE S TRATĒGOS : A D ELIBERATE R EJECTION OF H EROISM
Pericles Cunctator ?
In military matters, Pericles was inevitably bound not to benefit from more than a
limited degree of charisma, by reason of the proverbial circumspection that caused
Plutarch to compare him to Fabius Maximus, the Cunctator (delayer), the Roman consul who obstinately refused to confront the Carthaginians
following the defeat at Trasimene in 217 B.C., in order to give the Romans time to
reorganize their forces.
Nothing was more alien to Pericles than the kind of rashness displayed by military
leaders who were in quest of glory, even at the risk of imperiling the city: “nor
did he envy and imitate those who took great risks, enjoyed brilliant good fortune
and so were admired as great generals.” 31 In this respect, he deliberately turned his back on the heroic ideal that favored
combat in all circumstances, even if it meant paying the ultimate price, in accordance
with the ambivalent model set by