Free To Move the World by Jeffrey D. Sachs Page A

Standard
noted a “political climate that is more refreshing and hopeful than for a very long time.” 6
The Times
of London praised Kennedy’s “particular contribution” of emphasizing “the need to respect each other’s interests, to accept honest differences, and to refrain from imposing alien systems on smaller countries.” 7 In
The Guardian
, the British parliamentarian Richard Crossman called the speech “the most significant American policy declaration for many years,” adding, “The more carefully one reads the speech, the more clear it becomes that the President has at last found the courage to call off the cold war.” 8
Soviet Reactions

 
    Soviet reactions would be most vital to success. The White House carefully monitored the early Soviet reactions via U.S. government cables sent from Moscow. The news was encouraging. First, the two major newspapers
Pravda
and
Izvestiya
, which had a combined circulation of ten million readers, both carried the text of the president’s speech in full, a rarity for the Soviet press. 9 Second, the Soviets allowed the Voice of America and the BBC to transmit the speech by radio without the usual jamming of the airwaves. Clearly, the Soviet authorities were intent on making the Soviet people aware of the speech. The media reactions were also generally favorable. One U.S. report cited a Soviet news commentator’s statement that “hopes have emerged for a radical improvement of the international climate.” 10 The general tenor of the Soviet media was that Kennedy’s new policy proposals were a step forward, in line with the long-standing Soviet call for “peaceful coexistence.”
    Of greatest importance were the reactions of the Soviet leadership. Khrushchev’s reception of the speech was just as Kennedyintended: extremely positive and open to a treaty. British opposition leader Harold Wilson met Khrushchev soon after the speech, and according to Kennedy’s special assistant, the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Wilson “found [Khrushchev] deeply impressed and considerably more open minded about the test ban.” 11 Khrushchev called in Kennedy’s envoy Averell Harriman to tell him that Kennedy’s “was the greatest speech by any American President since Roosevelt.” 12 A CIA report the day after the speech noted:
    The Soviets were favorably surprised by the tenor of President Kennedy’s 10 June speech because it reflected a broad progressive approach toward solving current problems. The atmosphere created by this speech is now such that the possibilities of agreeing on a test ban treaty are very good. No chief of state would make such a speech unless he were completely convinced that agreement was probable. The only problem in the past which prevented a test ban treaty was Soviet doubt of the sincerity of U.S. intentions to enter into such an agreement … President Kennedy’s speech has gone a long way toward assuaging Soviet doubts of U.S. sincerity. 13
    In Khrushchev’s first public remarks on the speech, made in an interview with
Pravda
and
Izvestiya
on June 14, he was more measured and circumspect. He deemed it “a step forward in a realistic appraisal of the international situation,” and one that “stressed the need of finding ways which would rid mankind of the arms race and the threat of a thermonuclear world war.” 14 Yet he also signaled many points of disagreement, including inspections, U.S. overseas bases, and the U.S. suppression of national liberation movements. Khrushchev’s hedging was likely connected to strained relations with the Chinese, who had sent a critical open letter to the Soviet Communist Party the same day. 15
    While the signals were not perfect, it did seem that the Soviet Union was ready for at least some agreements. To bolster those prospects and to meet with key allies in the midst of these negotiations, Kennedy headed to Europe in late June. His travels took him to raucously enthusiastic public events in Germany