Free The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur by Mark Perry Page B

Budget another chance to sideline Roosevelt’s own recommendations. So he told Collins that he didn’t think it was necessary to “burden” Roosevelt with the issue. Surprisingly, Collins yielded, undoubtedly calculating that as MacArthur had shown a willingness to accede on the question of officer billets, Collins could give something back. The final bill gave MacArthur his victory—it wasn’t the $361 million he had counted on, but at $355.5 million, it was close enough.
    MacArthur celebrated the victory as well as the press commentary that greeted it. Congress, one reporter wrote, “voted MacArthur virtually everything he wanted.” The
New York Times
, however, was closer to the mark when it noted that the increases in military spending were a reflection of events in Europe and “prevalent war talk.” But even with much of the world preparing for conflict, the real reason for the increase in the military budget was MacArthur’s new status as Roosevelt’s choice to continue as chief of staff.
    MacArthur had been due for retirement at the end of 1934, but in August of that year (as MacArthur was retreating to his library at Fort Myer), Roosevelt began thinking about retaining him in the same position. The president’s reflections would have shocked MacArthur, whotold Eisenhower that his replacement “was a certainty.” Not surprisingly, Roosevelt’s closest advisors again opposed the move. They had weighed in twice against MacArthur before, just after Roosevelt’s inauguration and then again at the end of 1933, but this time their objections were strident. They agreed that it would have been politically difficult to remove MacArthur just after Roosevelt had become president and even more difficult during the first year of his presidency. Still, reappointing MacArthur now would signal that Roosevelt had decided to keep him on for the president’s four-year term.
    Worried about Roosevelt’s thinking, an exasperated Josephus Daniels penned yet another anti-MacArthur warning. “Secretary Dern asked me what I would do if I were Secretary of War,” Daniels wrote in a letter to Roosevelt. “I said: ‘Get a whole new Chief of Staff and a whole new set up in the Department just as soon as possible.’” The journalist then revived the argument he had made two years earlier. “MacArthur is a charming man,” he wrote, “but he was put in by your predecessor and thinks he should run the Army.” Daniels repeated that MacArthur was still opposed by veterans for his Anacostia actions: “The appointment of MacArthur would be deeply resented. My earnest advice is ‘
Don’t.’
”
    Not surprisingly, given John Pershing’s argument with MacArthur over George Marshall, Pershing then weighed in on the side of Daniels. Pershing argued that Roosevelt should appoint an old friend, Malin Craig, as the new army chief. Craig was the most qualified officer to replace MacArthur, Pershing told Roosevelt. The only other possible MacArthur replacement was George Simonds, a MacArthur protégé.
    But Roosevelt wasn’t any more convinced by Daniels’s arguments now than he had been two years earlier. Avoiding a fight with the Republicans was still a necessity, and MacArthur had not proven to be a liability. The president was even less influenced by Pershing, for while Malin Craig was an experienced and respected officer, Craig had used his influence inside the military to convince his fellow officers to vote for Hoover—an action so inappropriate that not even MacArthur had dared trying it. Nor did Roosevelt like General George Simonds, a MacArthur partisan who was commandant of the Army War College. Simonds coveted the chief of staff position and lobbied inside the army to ensure that his name was put forward.
    Roosevelt was also influenced by Congress, a number of whose members were suddenly speaking up on MacArthur’s behalf. Their unexpected endorsement was the result of the chief of staff’s careful cultivation of