with them, though the Barbarossas did not as yet know it, several companies of land troops designed to replace the garrison. Deprived of his land support by the rapid desertion of the Moors and Berbers, and threatened from the sea by a force considerably stronger and better armed than his own, Aruj was once again compelled to raise the siege. “He is said to have departed like one frantic, tearing his beard for mere madness, to find himself so baffled and disappointed.”
He refused to go back to Djerba, for he still felt that although the island had already proved its worth as a refuge and a place in which to recoup his losses, it was too far away from the main stream of western Mediterranean trade. Tunis also was out of the question, for to return to Tunis baffled a second time in an attempt on Bougie would be to court a strong rebuff from the Sultan. The latter was already deeply worried that the activities of the Turks would result in the destruction of his city at the hands of the Genoese.
On his two passages along the coast Aruj had already noted the small peninsula of Djidjelli sticking its craggy beak out into the sea, some forty miles to the east from Bougie. Possibly he had landed there on one or other occasion to water his ships. Certainly he knew that there was a harbour perfectly adequate for his galleots on the eastern side of the peninsula: a harbour protected by an off-lying islet, and fringed with rocks and shoals. The town itself was perched high above, and was almost inaccessible by frontal assault. From the rear, if its defences were improved, it was clear that the whole peninsula could be turned into an excellent fortress. There were no more than one thousand inhabitants, sturdy Berber farmers, who owed no allegiance to any Sultan, and who were more than happy to see the Turkish vessels in their harbour, bringing with them trade and a steady demand for their agricultural produce.
So in late September 1514, just in time to avoid the beginning of the stormy autumn season along the North African coast, Aruj and Khizr Barbarossa brought their twelve ships and their 1,100 Turks into the harbour of Djidjelli. Together with them there were several hundred Moors, as well as other adventurers who had joined their force for the assault on Bougie. The very fact that Aruj chose Djidjelli as his base, so near to the scene of his recent rebuff, suggests that he still had it in mind to attempt Bougie again at the first opportunity.
It was, according to Haedo, a hard autumn that year along that part of the coast, and the addition of so many mouths to feed in the small town and harbour soon meant that some sort of rationing had to be imposed. The Barbarossas, however, were careful to see that the native inhabitants were well treated by their men. If they needed to have a port at their backs, they knew how important it was that the people in their base should be their friends. If not, when they took to the sea again in spring, they might well return to find that their refuge had been betrayed behind them to the Spaniards.
As often happens in the Mediterranean, the weather which had been so harsh throughout September and October suddenly fined down in November to give days of cloudless calm. The Turkish captains knew that such weather might well last into mid or even late December, before the winter proper settled down over land and sea. There was just a chance—and Aruj and Khizr took it—of catching some “late swallows” on the wing between Spain and her domains in Naples and Sicily.
All twelve galleots, having taken aboard water and supplies, headed up into the Mediterranean. They spread themselves across the main shipping lane between Sicily, Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, and Spain. It took them nearly three days to reach their chosen station, about 125 miles from Djidjelli. Once there, they positioned themselves like a seine net across the sea. If each galleot can be regarded as something like the glass