Free The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance by Rupert Matthews

and weakened by its fighting retreat of the previous day. The II Corps of Georg von Pirch was present in full, as was von Thielmann’s III Corps. However, Bülow’s IV Corps was still miles away and was unlikely to arrive that day. Nevertheless, Blücher had 84,000 men at Ligny.
    The second problem was not known to the commanders. De Lancey’s estimates had it that Wellington’s army would be concentrated at Quatre Bras by mid afternoon. Once gathered, they would then march to Ligny and arrive at perhaps 5 pm. In fact, the army was so scattered and disorganized that it would not reach Quatre Bras before nightfall.
    Wellington turned to the map and pointed out his reservations about Blücher’s plan. He indicated the two main roads to Brussels from Quatre Bras and Nivelles. By marching to Ligny, Wellington would be leaving these roads undefended. Napoleon was famous for his quick manoeuvring and might opt to change direction suddenly and march up one of these roads to seize Brussels. Wellington did not mention his secret orders to keep the line of retreat open to the Royal Navy in the Scheldt, but this was his real objection to leaving the roads unguarded.
    Blücher and Gneisenau could not understand Wellington’s objections, and said so. At this point Müffling reminded Wellington that the Netherlands army under the Prince of Orange was much closer to Quatre Bras than the British troops. Wellington nodded, concluding that he could send the Dutch to help the Prussians while keeping some of his British troops back to guard the retreat route to the Scheldt. He turned to Blücher, said he expected his army to be gathered at Quatre Bras by 4 pm and said ‘Well then, I will come – provided I am not attacked myself.’ With that, Wellington and Müffling mounted their horses and rode off, while Gneisenau and Blücher returned to Ligny to finish arranging their army for a defensive battle.
     
    Deployments at Ligny
     
    The position at Ligny was undoubtedly a strong one and well suited to defence. From where the French were, near Fleurus, the main road to Sombreffe and on to Gembloux and Germany appeared to run over a gently undulating plain. In fact the plain was cut by the Ligny stream, which ran through a small, steep-sided valley. The stream itself was relatively small, but its banks were a tangle of woodlands with dense undergrowth that would be a real obstacle to any troops seeking to get through them. Along the stream were to be found the village of Ligny itself, plus the hamlets of Wagnelée, Saint-Amand-la-Haye, Saint-Amand, Tongrinelle, Boignée and Balâtre, plus a ruined castle and a handful of farms. All this was invisible to Napoleon.
     

    The battlefield of Ligny as seen from Blücher’s initial command post at the windmill at Brye. The undulating nature of the ground is clear, though the depth of the river and its steep banks are not apparent.
    In order to make the hidden stream even more of an obstacle, Blücher had his troops hack loopholes in any buildings facing the stream and build barricades where the stream’s banks were not blocked by undergrowth. Into these defences Blücher put a force of infantry with some artillery support. Most of his army was positioned on the higher ground behind the valley so that troops could be moved down to support any threatened sector as the French attack developed. Expecting Wellington to arrive on his right flank in the later afternoon, Blücher had left that flank relatively weak.
    It was these dispositions that Napoleon saw when he arrived at 11 am. Unaware of the fortified stream, he saw only the Prussian forces on the high ground and concluded that Blücher was in a weak position, especially on his right. Blücher would only adopt a position like this if he were expecting help from Wellington, but it did lay his army open to utter defeat if it were attacked before Wellington arrived.
    Napoleon quickly issued his orders. Ney was to block the road from Nivelles to