Free Sir Francis Walsingham by Derek Wilson Page B

foundation of all order, and the bourgeois and citizens are more bound together and united by it than by their trade in merchandise, the communication of laws, or anything else in a civil society . . . there is never more trouble or a greater tempest in a commonwealth than where there is some schism or dissension concerning the issue of religion. 15
    Ironically, it was a sentiment with which Walsingham and his friends would have heartily agreed. It seemed self-evident to sixteenth-century Europeans that political and social cohesion and stability were dependent on religious unity – one king, one law, one faith. It followed that anyone exercising or promoting a religion other than the one sanctioned by the government was guilty of sedition. Toleration implies that internal peace is more important than truth, for if opposing theologies are allowed to co-exist then neither can be the sole repository of truth. Such a view was unacceptable to all Catholic and Protestant activists.
    Confrontation turned into civil war in the spring of 1562. Fighting broke out all over France. The Huguenots, led by the Bourbon Prince de Condé, commanded several towns and proved difficult or impossible to dislodge. More importantly, this confessional slugging match became the focus for the international Reformation struggle. The pope sent 2,500 troops and Philip of Spain provided the Guises with limited financial backing. Four thousand cavalry arrived from Germany to support the Huguenot cause. And, in England, the queen responded reluctantly to appeals for aid.
    In the early years of her reign Elizabeth was uncertain about how to respond to events on the continent. She had inherited a war with France but differences had been settled in April 1559 by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. In response to later developments Throckmorton in Paris strenuously urged his royal mistress to set aside the agreementin order to succour Condé’s forces. His despatches pointed out that what was happening in France was only part of a mounting campaign aimed at all Protestant rulers, including Elizabeth herself. If the Huguenots were crushed the Guises would not hesitate to make common cause with their allies in Scotland to strike at England. The apparent attractions of appeasement – peace and avoidance of expense – were illusory. Elizabeth tired of Throckmorton’s importuning. She sent over another diplomat, Sir Thomas Smith, to act as a brake on the activities of her headstrong ambassador. But Throckmorton was now supported by Robert Dudley and by a majority on the Council. Men who had experienced exile and others who were closely associated with them felt a personal as well as an ideological obligation to their co-religionists. They were indebted to their friends abroad who had helped them during Mary’s reign. Now it was their turn to respond charitably to the entreaties of others suffering for the cause of the Gospel.
    Elizabeth saw things from a very different perspective. In her ethical scheme of things loyalty of subjects to their anointed ruler had pride of place. Aiding rebels was something she found difficult to square with her conscience. On the other hand there was Calais. This port, England’s last possession on the European mainland, had been lost in the recent war. At Cateau-Cambrésis she had agreed a face-saving formula by which the French promised to return it after eight years but no one believed that this would actually happen. Calais had strategic importance as a base from which to keep a check on traffic through the Narrows. But its prestige significance was greater. Its loss had been a blow to national pride. Its recovery would be a feather in Elizabeth’s cap. She realized that exploiting the current difficulty of Catherine de Medici would provide valuable diplomatic leverage. She agreed to send Condé 170,000 crowns and an English force under the command of Ambrose Dudley, Robert’s brother, recently created Earl of Warwick, to hold