for their comportment in office. In the last two hundred years of the Republic, the tribunes of the people (whose proposals in the popular assembly could not be vetoed by any consul) would lead the prosecution against corrupt executives. The Senate controlled the purse, foreign affairs, and the prosecution of crimes against the state, such as treason.
As for the people, they were eventually granted the authority to propose laws of their own, and they possessed a potent veto on the actions of the Senate. The Roman constitution compelled various elements in the society to depend upon one another; or, rather, taught by their piety and patriotism, the Romans resigned themselves to depend upon one another. Their constitution was more the result of their traditional virtues than the cause .
Polybius, a Greek, gives a short and admirable description of the moral value of the Roman system. It was not dreamed up by a philosopher, but was the result of centuries of compromise and of devotion to tradition. Even a true democracy, as described by Polybius, partakes of the nobility demanded by aristocracy and the obedience demanded by monarchy:
A state in which the mass of citizens is free to do whatever it pleases or takes into its head is not a democracy. But where it is both traditional and customary to reverence the gods, to care for our parents, to respect our elders, to obey the laws, and in such a community to ensure that the will of the majority prevails—this situation it is proper to describe as democracy.
The virtues of the Senate, meanwhile, were partly the result of its distance from the people. The people did not elect senators. Nobody elected senators; a senator is a former consul or other high officer. And senators (unless they disgraced themselves) served for life. They were therefore protected from the changes of mood that can sweep through a body politic. They felt those changes, and they dared not ignore them, but they need not act in haste. Indeed, their sluggishness to enact land reforms in the time of the Gracchi brothers (133–121), reserving huge tracts of conquered territory for themselves rather than relinquishing them to Rome and to the soldiers who had abandoned their farms to fight Rome’s wars, was decisive in the Republic’s slide into despotism and chaos, before Augustus and his reforms. But haste is usually more dangerous than caution, as there are many ways to get something wrong, and few ways, sometimes only one way, to get it right. Rome’s built-in conservatism generally served the state well. The senators did not have to worry about election, so they did not have to pander to the people. Our word “ambition” comes from the Latin ambitio, which literally meant “running around,” that is, scrambling for votes. It was a term of reproach. Most often the Senators resisted the people, until the people compelled them to yield to measures that the senators themselves confessed were just. If the senators were sometimes hard of hearing when the poor came to plead, their wealth enabled them, at least until the end of the Third Punic War, to resist the temptation to use state power to enrich themselves.
An anecdote from the early Gallic Wars (ca. 386 BC) shows what virtues a patriotic Roman wanted to see in his senators. The Gauls had come pouring down from the Alps, attracted by the wealth and the warm climate of Italy, to storm the city. But Rome was undefended; the bulk of the army was stalled in northern Italy. The senators took the situation in hand. Rome must be saved. They ordered the few soldiers they had to take the women and children and the infirm to the citadel—a little walled city within the city—before the Gauls came. They themselves would remain in their homes, so as not to strain a tight food supply. The Gauls came, and found empty streets. Taken aback, they peered into the houses, where they saw, here and there, old men in togas and the purple stripe of
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