Free The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History by Don Oberdorfer, Robert Carlin Page B

believe that he must strengthen his domestic position to deal with the North, Habib informed Washington that “there is little doubt that these measures are unnecessary given any objective view of the situation.”
    The pressing question was what the United States should do in view of its extensive interests and its historic leverage in South Korean politics. In the aftermath of World War II and the division of the peninsula, Washington had played the central role in anointing Syngman Rhee as the country’s first president, and in 1960, in the face of a student-led popular uprising, it had also played a major role in forcing him to leave power. In 1961 the US Embassy and the US Command had spoken out publicly but ineffectually against General Park’s military coup against the constitutionally elected post-Rhee government, but it had then successfully applied steady and persistent pressure to force Park to reestablish civilian government. Now the United States was confronted with what amounted to a coup in place, a power grab by Park to eliminate all legal opposition and retain power for as long as he wished.
    Habib, a tough-talking, politically astute Foreign Service veteran from Brooklyn with extensive previous experience in Korea, was furious that his embassy had obtained no early warning of Park’s surprise from its own sources. As he was well aware, the timing for the move had been chosen with care. Only three weeks earlier, Washington had done nothing when Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos, in a very similar maneuver that had been closely watched by Park, declared martial law and jettisoned his country’s existing political institutions. Both Marcos and Park had sprung their power grabs during the campaign period of a US presidential election, when American presidents are more reluctant than usual to make controversial decisions in foreign affairs. The Nixon-Kissinger White House, which prided itself on realpolitik in diplomacy, was fixated on the politically difficult situation in Vietnam, according to then Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, at the time the State Department’s senior Asia expert. “They didn’t have time to be bothered” by Korea developments, he recalled.
    With the plans drawn up and already in motion, Habib reported to Washington that “only the most drastic, positive and immediate actions by the U.S. might turn Park from the course on which he has embarked.” In a pivotal judgment that established the limits of American engagement, Habib declared that “it is not incumbent upon the U.S. to take on the responsibility of getting Park to reverse his course within the next fewhours. Nevertheless, we believe that in the long run, Park is creating major problems for himself and for his relationship with us and with others.” Habib recommended that “we should be extremely circumspect in our public comments while making it clear that we are not in any way associated with the government’s internal actions.”
    Washington accepted the advice of its ambassador and decided not to oppose Park’s actions. The State Department cabled Habib, “We agree that [Park’s] contemplated measures are unnecessary, and have grave reservations about the course he has embarked upon.” Habib was instructed to tell Park that taking such a far-reaching decision without a serious exchange of views with the United States was “incomprehensible in light of the past sacrifices and present support which we have given to the Republic of Korea and specifically to the present government.” Nevertheless, no action was recommended to change Park’s mind. If he were asked whether the United States would recommend against imposing martial law, Habib was instructed to answer that “this is an internal matter. . . . It is up to him to decide.”
    Washington’s main concern seemed to be the proposed public statement accompanying the announcement, citing the American rapprochement with China and the