Free Bombing Hitler by Hellmut G. Haasis

there on an official basis as well as many volunteers. The bishop had left it up to the pastors how they were to proceed. It would have been possible to address the assassination attempt in the prayer of intercession at the end of the service—a text that is not customarily preserved in the record. But no proclamations about the attack were recorded, even though, starting on November 12, hordes of Gestapo officials descended on the community, interrogating and arresting dozens of residents.
    In the Catholic Church, the reaction was delayed. The newsletter of the bishopric of Freiburg ran a remarkably extensive text, which gave the impression that the delay should be offset with more commitment. The twenty-four lines comprising the first section might well have appeared in the Völkischer Beobachter, judging by the content and the choice of words. The second section expressed thanks to “God’s Providence,” but it was not until the third section that the text declared that Pope Pius XII, through the Apostolic Nuncio in Berlin, had expressed to Hitler his “best wishes.”
    The newsletter of the bishopric of Limburg claimed that the attack had been planned by a “diabolically murderous mind,” but that “Divine Providence” had thwarted the plan and “God’s hand guides history.”
    And then Rudolf Hess delivered his lengthy speech at the official state ceremony commemorating the dead. God was “with the righteous cause,” he said, and would therefore “let the Germany of Adolf Hitler prevail.”
    It should be taken into consideration that this position was to be heard in the Catholic Church only at the higher levels, and not in all dioceses. Nothing of a similar nature was reported from the bishoprics of Rottenburg and Trier. In contrast to the Protestant clergy, there were, even at that time, numerous German priests in concentration camps. By the end of the war there were almost five hundred in Dachau alone. Many of them provided assistance to other prisoners while there and even assumed the duties of the prisoners. They did not, however, allow the SS to use them in their persecution of the Communists.

VI
The Evidence Mounts
    W HILE STILL ON his private train the night of the attack, Hitler ordered Himmler to put the police crime division in charge of the investigation. He did not trust the SS or the Gestapo with the work of gathering detailed information. At first, Reich director of criminal investigation Nebe suspected a “Party maneuver”; but once Hitler demanded a serious investigation, this option was eliminated.
    Alongside the rather politically motivated search for evidence there was a less conspicuous line of investigation being conducted that addressed the question: How was such an attack even possible, given that the Gestapo was responsible for organizing security everywhere, especially security for Hitler? There soon emerged a body of evidence that was quickly buried, causing repercussions that persist today. There was no long-term security service for the Bürgerbräukeller. Throughout the year, there was no one to conduct security inspections of the hall, which was used not only for Party functions, but for dances as well. Even the night before the memorial celebration, no guard had gone through the hall. The Alter Kämpfer Josef Gerum, an official in the central office of the Gestapo in Munich who was in charge of security matters, appeared just an hour before people were admitted in order to inspect the entire building from roof to cellar. He looked for any explosives that might be lying around, but never thought of looking at the pillars in the hall.
    Until then, a comprehensive security service for Hitler had been considered unnecessary—and every year it had been demonstrated anew that this view was correct. The dictatorship relied on two myths that had sufficed for protection. One myth presented the Führer as sent by