capture the
insurgent leader. He selected eighty Tagalog-speaking Macabebes who disguised themselves as insurgents coming to reinforce
Aguinaldo. Funston armed them with Mauser and Remington rifles, typical weapons for the undergunned insurgents. To make the
reinforcements seem more believable, four Tagalog turncoats performed the role of insurgent officers. To make the bait even
more enticing, five American officers acted as prisoners and accompanied the column. Nothing if not personally brave—he had
earned the Congressional Medal of Honor in 1899—Funston was one of the five.
MacArthur approved of the desperate plan—his chief of staff wrote the secretary of war that he did not expect ever to see
Funston again—and on March 6, 1901, a navy gunboat sailed from Manila Bay to deposit the raiding party on a deserted Luzon
beach sixty straight-line miles from Palanan. So began the most celebrated operation of the guerrilla war. No mission like
this could unfold seamlessly. A harrowing 100-mile trek that called upon physical stamina and quick-witted improvisation brought
the column to Palanan on March 23, 1901. To allay any possible suspicions, Funston sent runners ahead to deliver two convincing
cover letters. They were written on stationery that had been captured at an insurgent base. Not only did they bear the letterhead
“Brigade Lacuna” but they were signed by the brigade’s commander, an officer whose writing Aguinaldo was certain to recognize.
In fact a master Filipino forger who worked for the Americans had signed the letters. The letters informed Aguinaldo of the
impending arrival of the reinforcements he had requested along with a special bonus of captured American officers.
While Funston and his fellow officers hid in the nearby jungle, the column’s sham insurgent officers went ahead. A last obstacle
remained: the unfordable Palanan River. Two “officers” crossed in a canoe and gave instructions for the Macabebes to follow.
The two “officers” approached Aguinaldo’s headquarters to see a uniformed honor guard formed to greet them. The cover letter
had done its work. Aguinaldo was completely deceived. For a very nervous thirty minutes the two “officers” regaled the insurgent
commander with stories about their recent ordeal. Finally the Macabebes arrived. They formed up across from the honor guard
as if in preparation to salute Aguinaldo. Then at a signal they opened fire at the startled headquarters guards. Inside Aguinaldo’s
headquarters, the two “officers” seized Aguinaldo. Meanwhile, Funston and his band emerged from the jungle to take charge.
The effect of the surprise was so overwhelming that Funston’s commandos managed to escape with their prize and rendezvous
with the waiting gunboat.
Funston took Aguinaldo to Manila, where MacArthur treated him with great courtesy, even to the point of having his staff dine
with the insurgent leader. Within a few days Aguinaldo was exploring terms of surrender. Within a month he issued a proclamation
calling on all insurgents to surrender and for Filipinos to accept United States rule.
In a campaign suffering from slow and indeterminate results, Aguinaldo’s conversion was something concrete. MacArthur and
the War Department took full advantage, proclaiming the incident the most important single military event of the year. Among
the skeptics were the midshipmen of the Naval Academy standing in the left-field bleachers at the first Army-Navy baseball
game ever played. Arthur MacArthur’s son Douglas was Army’s left fielder. The midshipmen heckled Douglas with the chant:
MacArthur! MacArthur!
Are you the Governor General Or a hobo?
Who is the boss of this show?
Is it you or Emilio Aguinaldo? 24
Indeed, the claim that Aguinaldo’s capture was decisive overstated the facts. Instead, although it was not clearly apparent
at the time, MacArthur’s stern policies had already begun to erode