Free The Challenge for Africa by Wangari Maathai Page A

should) respond to the wishes of their citizenry. This is also why empowering local communities, promoting local democracy, and decentralizing power into, for example, parliamentary constituencies is so important. (I write more about my personal experience of this process, and ideas for its wider application, in chapter 7.) In the process of engaging civil society, the three legs of the stool can be strengthened: governance becomes more open, transparent, and accountable; equity and fairness are promoted; and prospects for peace are bolstered.
    At the moment, in too many African countries, concepts of civil society and democratic space are merely theoretical or abstract. However, while many Africans are not willing to enthusiastically embrace the
concepts
of accountability and transparency, it is clear that when Africans
practice
and
live
them, they realize the need for them and value them deeply. This is why in order for any vision of development to work, those who believe in transparency and accountability must communicate it to the people. Thus, while Africans need to take the lead role in supporting and strengthening civil societies—and many already are—there is a place for the international community, if it approaches development holistically, with a view to accelerating this process through moral support and financial assistance.
    The practical challenge, of course, is to determine what responsibilities the international institutions concerned with development and human rights and governance (whether African or otherwise) have to those societies that are balancing on two, one, or perhaps none of the legs. Should we isolatethose countries until they rebuild their stool on their own, and in the meantime leave ordinary people to suffer the consequences of violence, bad governance, and the theft of national resources?
    It appears that while it would not be responsible to deliver large sums of aid money to those countries ruled by autocrats, citizens ought not to be forgotten until they get themselves out of their difficulties. This isn't simply a matter of protecting the human rights of individuals; it is also about acknowledging the potential knock-on effects of dysfunctional governments. The selling off of natural resources for the personal enrichment of a small elite, suppressing democratic activities and harassing members of civil society, fomenting violence between communities or political parties, mismanaging the economy, and neglecting basic services—all these contribute to the likelihood that the state will eventually collapse.
    If it does, a country can be taken over by warlords, factions, or clans that seek whatever they can get in the short term, without regard for the long-term prospects of the nation. (Economist Paul Collier has calculated that the average civil war costs a country and neighboring nations about $64 billion, and that the main risk factors for civil wars and coups are low income and growth levels, both of which are widespread in Africa. 13 ) Once the vicious cycle of violence, vengeance, and hatred starts, it can quickly become unstoppable. And the consequences will last for years, if not decades, spilling over into other countries and causing instability and further human misery. We have seen this tragedy in Somalia, Congo, and the Darfur region of Sudan.
    In these situations, other African countries, the African Union, and the international community ought to remain engaged in dialogue with leaders and civil society groups and urge reforms, containing the damage as much as possible. Judicious application of international and local sanctions that targetthe perpetrators of injustices while not deepening the people's suffering offer a way to apply pressure to governments that ignore the plight of their people, as do arms embargoes and freezing the bank accounts of such leaders. These, of course, are tools and not panaceas; all nation-states have their own interests to pursue, and