Free One Hundred Victories by Linda Robinson

the like) and basic marksmanship. Other instructional blocks covered human rights, the rule of law, and police and checkpoint procedures.
    Much of the target practice was at close range, twenty-five meters. The role of the villagers was to defend, not to go on offensive raids. Any suspects they detained were to be immediately turned over to the Afghan district chief of police or his officers. Those blue-gray uniformed police were never deployed outside of district centers, and as of 2010, about half of that force still lacked training. In the rush to provide a police force, they had been recruited and sent to work without even the three weeks of training that Hayes’s recruits were receiving. This created immediate tension as the district police chief watched the new force receive instruction from America’s elite forces.
    The skills of the police recruits gradually improved, and new recruits slowly materialized. Hayes spent a lot of time sitting in meetings but saying little. His entire method was to let the Afghans take the lead, so he only provided input before or after meetings. He sat on the sidelines and let Captain Azizullah sit at the meeting table with Barwari, the elders, and the other local officials. Hayes knew his most important role was behind the scenes; it was vital that Afghans interact directly in the formal meetings. Many conventional forces, and even civilian diplomats, did not heed that basic rule of advising, choosing instead to sit at the main table and often dominate the discussion. Hayes had developed an excellent relationship with the conventional battalion in Maiwand as well as with the brigade commander in Zhari. He used his easy and irreverent humor to build rapport, and he offered suggestions frequently without being pushy. He played a role well above his rank—and no one bristled.
    One day after a shura at the district center, Jan Mohammed and the other local police commanders gathered around Hayes to share the latest news: they had just received the first pay for their recruits from the district police chief. Hayes was astounded. He had expected that it would take months and endless bureaucratic hassles for the Afghan government to take charge of the payroll, but the money spigot had turned on shortly after the office of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) in Kabul processed their biometrics, ID cards, and MOI contracts. The first payday was not perfect—some commanders had received too much or too little based on their number of recruits—but it was a welcome first step, a sign that the Afghan government was embracing the local police concept and might just be able to make it work.
    Hayes felt that the district government was also coming along. Barwari, the governor, was known to make money on the side, but he was relatively popular because he never tried to solicit bribes from the poor. Hayes had read intelligence assessments from the hydra-headed coalition forces recommending his removal on corruption grounds, but Hayes thought removing him would be a mistake. Barwari was reaching out to more and more communities, and he had begun to stay in Maiwand, only returning to his family in Kandahar City on weekends. {43}
    One incident in Ezabad led to a breakthrough as the team’s long tour drew to a close. Jan Mohammed’s checkpoint was attacked one night and some of his police were wounded in exchange of fire. He was livid. Believing the shooter had come from Ezabad, he rampaged through the village seeking the perpetrators, firing at those he believed responsible. The next day, the elders appeared at the team’s gate, demanding the departure of Jan Mohammed and his men. An elder named Daoud offered to generate a police force from Ezabad residents. They would rather have their own sons out at the checkpoints, he said. {44}
    Thus the American and Afghan special forces teams trained the first class of eleven Ezabad defenders. Hayes did not intend to let Jan Mohammed go, however, since he was a