Free Defection Games (Dan Gordon Intelligence Thriller) by Haggai Carmon

knowledge.
    Al Zarwai nodded, expressionless, his eyes on me. I was sure I had his attention.
    “I need your help to assess how to go about it. We have very strong ties with German, Belgian, and Dutch manufacturing companies. They had previously traded with Iran but had to stop under international pressure. However, they now realize that Chinese and Russian companies came in their place, and the sky didn’t fall. I think these manufacturing companies would agree to resume their exports to Iran if they could be guaranteed safe passage, to keep them out of hot water with their own governments as well as the U.S government. They conduct substantial trade with U.S companies and, for obvious reasons, don’t want their plans to resume trading with Iran to wind up being public knowledge. I myself have nothing to lose by pissing off the Americans—my company operates out of Europe and has no American interests—but unfortunately the companies we represent could lose many millions if they wind up blacklisted by the U.S government.”
    “I understand,” he said, very calm, very cool, still his face remained expressionless. Had I piqued his interest? His eyes betrayed nothing; he had an excellent poker face, but his body language betrayed his effort to express no emotion. He was interested.
    I went on. “European newspapers have written quite a lot recently about how the American government is banning American banks from doing any business with Iranian banks. So when I was talking to my affiliated companies about potential business with Iran, the first question they asked me was, how do you prevent business with Iran from being identified by the U.S . ? Can we use European banks without branches or ties with the U.S . to avoid trouble?” I was trying to convey that I knew that the U.S . Treasury had compiled a list of Iran’s major banks, such as Saderat, Bank Melli, and Sepah, and had blacklisted them along with many other banks and individuals, so, obviously, these banks are out.
    "Why?" he asked, again with placid eyes. Although I was certain he knew the answer.
    "Because the European companies we work with insist upon receiving letters of credit and bank wire transfers for the goods sold. They know that the U.S . is monitoring the world’s banking activities to detect illegal trade with Iran in violation of U.S . and U.N . sanctions, and they don't want to get caught doing business with Iran. The U.S . reaction is likely to be — well, painful.” I paused, waiting for a comment from that Sphinx, but he just sat there nodding his head without saying anything.
    A moment later, he finally reacted. Slow gears? Or did something about me finally click? He’d sized me up and liked what he saw? 
    “Don’t worry,” he said almost casually as he took his glasses off. He began cleaning them with a lens wipe. “We use intermediary banks for these purposes. Iranian banks know how to do it.”
    I knew what they were doing: “stripping” — asking intermediary foreign banks to remove any markers of the transactions’ ties to Iran or to Iranian banks.
    “As you must know, Mr. Van der Hoff, we like to help our customers meet their legitimate goals. I think that what you are looking for is possible. However, that is not the type of business we do.”
    Our research had definitely shown his bank as being active in financing hush exports to Iran, and now he was playing hard to get? When he saw my slightly raised eyebrows, he added, “We finance transactions, issue letters of credit and other documentary financing. Regarding all other aspects of your commercial relationship, I suggest you meet Mr. Kamiar Nemati.” That name sounded very Iranian to me. Nonetheless, his extra cautiousness was obvious and understood. He couldn’t risk his bank and its Swiss parent by discussing ways and means to bypass U.N . sanctions with every Tom, Dick, and Harry who barged into his office, particularly when the visitor could be a U.S .