Free A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower by Kenneth Henshall Page B

The Muromachi Period (1333–1568)
     
    In 1333 Go-Daigo returned to Kyto, supported by Ashikaga Takauji and Nitta Yoshisada. He hoped to re-establish direct imperial rule. However, this attempt was to prove short-lived, for he soon lost Takauji’s support. Takauji wanted to be granted the title of shgun. Go-Daigo refused this, for he wanted to avoid any weakening of direct imperial rule through shguns, regents, or retired emperors. 47 Thwarted, Takauji turned his back on Go-Daigo’s central government, pointedly preferring to remain in the east after he had returned to Kamakura to put down a brief revival of Hjsupport.
    Go-Daigo considered Takauji to be defying him and presently sent Nitta Yoshisada – Takauji’s sometime ally, sometime rival – to bring him into line. However, it was Takauji who prevailed, defeating Yoshisada and forcing him to flee. Yoshisada was eventually killed in 1338 by one of Takauji’s allies. Takauji then captured Kyto, forcing Go-Daigo to flee to Yoshino in the densely wooded mountains some 100 km south of Kyto. In Kyto itself Takauji promptly installed as emperor a member of a rival imperial family branch, Kmy(1322–88, r.1336–48), who in 1338 finally conferred on him his much-coveted title of shgun.
    It is undeniable that Takauji was an opportunist, prepared to shift his alliances to suit the circumstances most favourable to himself. But he was not at all exceptional in this – other than in his degree of success. The popular belief nowadays is that samurai were men of absolute loyalty. Many undoubtedly were, and sacrificed their life for their lords. However, it was also very common among samurai of the Middle Ages to switch sides. Troop figures given in the mid-fourteenth-century military tale
Taiheiki
reveal that in one engagement against Takauji (at Hakone), NittaYoshisada’s 70,000 men were reduced to a mere 100 despite having numerical superiority over Takauji’s 60,000. Even allowing for distorted figures, this can only be explained by massive defections. 48
    This clearly shows the limits of personal loyalty 49 – and once again the prevalence of pragmatism over principle. It forms a stark contrast between reality and the popular image of the samurai. And it forms a poignant contrast between the typical medieval samurai and the typical Second World War Japanese soldier, who seems to have been far readier to fight to the death than the samurai whose tradition he somewhat inaccurately believed himself to be upholding. Like the strength of the family, the ‘fanatical’ loyalty of many twentieth-century soldiers reflects the fact that Japan’s later leaders were to re-learn the value of indoctrination – something not so obvious in the medieval world, where fear and self-interest seem to have been greater behavioural determinants.
    Further evidence of pragmatism on the part of samurai is seen in the use of the
horo
. A
horo
is a cloak of silk or similar light material worn behind the upper body, fastened at the neck or shoulders and lower down the back at the waist. (The characters for it are ‘mother’ and ‘clothing’, suggesting swaddling clothes or similar.) Though it may also have served as an identifier of the wearer, it would seem that its primary function was to deflect arrows aimed at a warrior fleeing on horseback – though some foot-soldiers also used them. The movement while fleeing, especially on horseback, makes the
horo
billow out behind, deflecting and/or entrapping arrows, and recent field-tests have shown their remarkable efficacy. The use of the
horo
tells us a number of things. First, a warrior on horseback would almost certainly be an elite, and thus in theory loyal to his lord, yet instead of fighting to the death they chose to flee; and second, their opponents did not hesitate to try to shoot them in the back. In practice both parties would know that the
horo
would only provide partial cover anyway, for it is better to aim for the combination of