Free Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda by Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker Page A

hold dear and what they hope for: “a perverse form of religious hope,” “earthly glory and reward,” and “political hope” for the creation of a greater Palestinian state. Within that toxic mix, Feith saw the potential to exploit an unusual opportunity: “This suggests a strategic course for us: attack the sources of these malignant hopes.”
    Reviewing the Pavel-Kroenig brief, Feith suggested a few changes to tighten and polish the new deterrence proposal, putting it into one-paragraph briefing slides, the way Rumsfeld liked to digest new ideas. Seven weeks after walking in the door of the Pentagon, Kroenig had completed a PowerPoint briefing that was on its way to the secretary of defense.
    Rumsfeld could be a hard man to read, but Feith surely knew that the briefing had a good chance of appealing to him. One of Rumsfeld’s favorite axioms is “When you can’t solve a problem, expand it.” He describes his most-favored posture as “forward leaning.” As secretary of defense, he terrorized those who came to staff meetings unprepared but was impressed by those who stood up to him. Rumsfeld truly had hoped to be a “change agent” within the ossified Pentagon, so he appreciated those with fresh, transformational ideas. It was therefore no surprise that he was pleased by the presentation of a “new deterrence” against terrorism. Pavel and Kroenig had identified the specific “territory,” physical and virtual, that terrorists hold dear:
     
    ■ Calculus of chances for success of their attacks
    ■ Personal glory
    ■ Personal reputation
    ■ Support among Muslim populations
    ■ Publicity
    ■ Network cohesion and dependability
    ■ Trust in fellow cell members
    ■ Well-being of their family
    ■ Enhancement of the Muslim community
    ■ Material assets
    ■ Growing membership for the movement
    ■ Strategic success
    The United States needed to impose costs on that “territory,” put it at risk, and deny terrorists the benefits they expect to receive—that was the essence of the “new deterrence.” As was the case with traditional deterrence, the idea was to take steps to alter the behavior and thinking of your adversary while simultaneously taking steps to reduce his ability to alter your behavior and thinking.
    The challenge to the new deterrence became one of cracking the organizational DNA of constantly evolving militant networks, especially as Al Qaeda adopted a new business model, franchising out activities and becoming as big a threat as an inspirational idea as in its operations. That would require the U.S. government to focus not solely on bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s senior leadership but also on a proliferating network of cells in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the rest of the Middle East, along with much of Africa, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The original slides for the Pavel-Kroenig concept for deterring and dissuading terrorist networks listed nine functions required by militant networks to survive, thrive, and operate. Here is the air and water and land of terrorism:
     
    ■ Leadership
    ■ Safe havens
    ■ Intelligence
    ■ Communications
    ■ Movement
    ■ Weapons
    ■ Personnel
    ■ Ideology
    ■ Finances
    This was the presentation that Rumsfeld took to his meeting with President Bush at Crawford. According to participants at the session, the president was not exactly dismissive of the concept, but he was openly skeptical. Kill or capture—those were the tactics of the Bush war on terror, and the concept briefed by Rumsfeld did not resonate. “Bush listened to it,” said one senior official. “He was reflective. But it was clear he was not really buying into it.”
    In an opportune coincidence, also present at Crawford was General James E. Cartwright, the top officer of the Strategic Command, which has custody and control of the traditional tools of nuclear retaliation: the long-range bombers and the warhead-carrying missiles in land-based silos and aboard submarines. Cartwright was