Free Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America's Secret Campaign Against Al Qaeda by Eric Schmitt, Thom Shanker Page B

on hand to brief the president on missile defense. Bush turned to him and asked his opinion of applying Cold War deterrence theories to counterterrorism. Cartwright had not been briefed on the Feith-Pavel-Kroenig proposal but had been thinking through these issues in parallel. He discussed how if one believes missile defense adds to deterrence—and Bush was a huge advocate of that—then the application to counterterrorism followed naturally. In missile defense, you hope to inject a high level of doubt into the mind of a potential attacker that a first strike will be successful and certainty that it will provoke retaliation. Ditto with deterrence and terrorism. “If you can remove a certainty of success in striking an objective, if you make the price too high, then you increase the opportunity the adversary will not strike,” Cartwright said. “Ambiguity and uncertainty: That is the calculus of missile defense as contributing to an overall deterrence strategy.” He applied it to terrorism: “If you can convince a suicide bomber that he most likely will only kill himself, then you have increased chances you can influence his thinking to not strap on the vest. Applying deterrence theories to terrorism may not eliminate the threat, but you can increase your chances of influencing an adversary’s behavior, his cost-benefit analysis—and perhaps deter an attack.”
    Bush was the most important skeptic but hardly the only one. Pavel and Kroenig had to crack institutional resistance throughout the Pentagon. Some initial push-back came from the community of traditional deterrence strategists, who argued that Pavel and Kroenig were misappropriating a powerful historical term simply because it resonated and was a persuasive bumper sticker. “Don’t define deterrence so narrowly,” Kroenig said to these skeptics as he shopped around the new concept. “During the Cold War, deterrence meant threatening unacceptable damage on an adversary. No other use was allowed. But an expansive concept of deterrence can be used today to restrict an enemy’s actions in the world of counterterrorism. It contributes to a national objective.”
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    In March 2006, Bush signed the twelve-page National Security Presidential Directive 46; an accompanying strategy document was released with great fanfare six months later. The work by Barry Pavel and Matt Kroenig, under Feith’s leadership, was incorporated into the final documents. During the review process overseen by the National Security Council, the following text was approved: “A new deterrence calculus combines the need to deter terrorists and supporters from contemplating a WMD attack and, failing that, to dissuade them from actually conducting an attack.” The emerging belief that terrorists could be swayed and dissuaded from action by various forms of deterrence marked a stunning change of direction in the government’s thinking on dealing with terrorists.
    A new notion of deterrence was finding its way into the daily business of the Pentagon and the rest of the national security agencies. On February 3, 2006, a month before NSPD-46 was formally approved, the Pentagon briefed reporters on another significant planning effort, the Defense Department’s quadrennial review of defense priorities and policies. In his opening statement, Ryan Henry, one of Feith’s top deputies, explained, “We will selectively be able to enhance our deterrence anywhere of our choosing around the globe, but that deterrence will not be a one-size-fits-all of massive retaliation that we’ve built up over the last fifty years. It’ll also be augmented by an ability to deter rogue powers and also terrorists and their networks.”
    Al Qaeda soon responded to the new American strategy of deterrence but in an unexpected way. In September 2007, Sheik Abu Yahya al-Libi, a top Al Qaeda official, released a videotape offering the United States several unsolicited tips on how to defeat the terrorist