anytime they like in two weeks. They can airlift a division and take the choke points in two days. All we have to stop them is a couple of antique ship-based nuclear weapons.
âWhat could we do about it? Iâve discussed it with your boss, General Cannon. The Shah-era strategy, theater nuclear strikes, is out of the question now. The Soviets have us outgunned four-to-one in medium-range missiles, and they can reinforce faster. Cannonâs plan is to put six light divisions into the Zagros Mountains. Once theyâre dug in, they might stop an invasion. But it would take five weeks for them to get there. The limiter is heavy lift, because no one in this part of the world will let us base equipment in advance.
âSo really we canât stop them. The Russians know that as well as we do. So we just canât let Iran destabilize. Even Khomeiniâs government is better than that.
âOur strategy doesnât have anything to do with âfreedom of the seas.â We have to keep either side from winning and bring them both to the table. Over time, we can then reestablish a relationship with Iran, which is the key to the whole Gulf area. And that, gentlemen, is why youâre here. Not to fight a war. To end one.â
âThis is all very enlightening,â said Hart. He had leaned forward to look at the map. âBut whatâs it got to do with us? Broad-brush strategy belongs to the Joint Chiefs. I appreciate congressional interest, and I understand your concerns. Particularly the budgetary question. But as far as Iâm concerned, I have my orders, I have sufficient forces, and I know how best to use them. Give me credit for that. Therefore, and let me put this as gently as possible, Iâm still not sure why youâre here.â
âAdmiral, youâre in charge of our forces in the Gulf. Thatâs fine, but weâre not sure you have the long-range interests of the country in mind. This buildup is forcing us into a no-win situation. The Navyâs strong enough here to start a war, but not strong enough to win it. Unfortunately, we canât afford a war in Southwest Asia. And the more we weaken Iran, the more inviting we make it for the U.S.S.R. to intervene.
âNow, as you know, we, not the Executive, are responsible under the Constitution for final oversight of foreign and military policy. The Chairman has decided itâs time to reexamine that policy, and decide whether to pull the plug on it. And that means the War Powers Act. Sixty days, after we invoke itâand you people are out of here.â
After a long silence, broken only by the hum of the defective air conditioning, Byrne said, âYou wouldnât do that.â
âI assure you, we would, and thatâs exactly what Senator Talmadge is considering.â
Finally, Hart cleared his throat. He knocked out the pipe in an ashtray, the blows hammer-loud, and got up. âI believe that lays your concerns out adequately,â he said dryly. âAnd gives usâright, Jack?âsome idea of the basis for your being here. I personally think invoking the Act would be a disaster for the West. But as you say, itâs the law.
âIâll support your fact-finding mission, Ms. Titus, on that basis. Shall we go up to my office? We should look at the ship schedules, discuss your itinerary. That is, if you have time.â
She nodded and crossed the room. But Trudell already had her briefcase, recorder, and purse. He held the door for her, too. She said âThank youâ coldly as she brushed by him.
The corridors were dim, 1960s style, lined with cork boards, yellowing notices, and tables of rank of various nations. They climbed a flight of worn stairs and Trudell held the door again, this time for them both. The other officers lingered in the hall. Hart went immediately to a coffee maker, turned, raised his eyebrows; she nodded. He took his in a Styrofoam cup and gave her