Free The Gulf by David Poyer

at the height of Vietnam. Godwin’s resigned, Weinberger’s own procurement chief, because Defense has no noticeable commitment to controlling spending.
    â€œNow, you tell me you have fifteen ships in the Gulf. That’s horseshit. My count is twenty-five, with the Forrestal battle group, and if you include everything, minesweeps, auxiliaries, survey ships—thirty-eight. I estimate our effort here is running almost a million dollars a day in above-normal costs. That doesn’t include losses. Maintaining a carrier in the Indian Ocean is straining our entire defense posture. It’s showing in retention, upkeep, and manning. And all at a time when Congress is desperate to cut expenses. I’m sure you’ve heard of Gramm-Rudman, Admiral?”
    Hart said in a fatherly tone, “These forces pay for themselves. If the Iranians were ever able to close the Straits—”
    â€œPlease let me continue. Point two. Several people in the Association for a Rational Defense have told me the Gulf proves we’ve built the wrong kind of navy. We’re top-heavy in carriers and expensive cruisers, leading-edge technology, but when we had to sweep mines, you came to us hat in hand and said you had to mobilize the reserves. That made people very angry on the Hill, Admiral. We mean to modify the Defense Five-Year Plan to reflect this sort of oversight.”
    Hart was turning red now. He tried to interrupt again, but she kept on, her voice calm but insistent, hammering fact after fact into the smoky air. “Point three. The Western Europeans are increasingly concerned about what you’re doing out here. The recent defense ministers’ meeting at the Hague—well, I’m sure you read your press summary. They don’t understand why we have such large forces here when, as you say, the opponents are fanatics in speedboats. They’re afraid we’re going to engage Iran for reasons of our own. They’re supporting us so far, but every new incident makes them more nervous. The French and the Dutch are especially wary. They’re not beyond pulling out their forces and letting us go it alone.
    â€œPoint four. The Gulf states aren’t ‘happy,’ they’re desperate. They all have large Shi’ite minorities and any hint of crusading encourages revolt. They have to live here after we’ve gone home. They’re worried about trading relationships, about the attacks on their oil platforms, and they wonder every day whether Hormuz is going to be closed.
    â€œNow let’s get to what concerns me, gentlemen. That’s what the Iranians are going to do. The war’s stalemated in the north. It has to be settled, but without Khomeini’s having to tell millions of bereaved families their sons died for nothing.
    â€œHis strategy may be to expand the war southward, into the Gulf. If it succeeds there, Iran’s a geopolitical winner. If it fails, if the major powers step in and force peace, it can be presented as a dictated armistice, a stab in the back by the Great Satan. The way the Pasdaran are being used is consistent with this. They’re perceived as out of control, but the chaos they cause plays right into Iran’s long-range plans.
    â€œNow, the last point I want to make. And probably the most important.” She got up, drawing their eyes with her, feeling now their hostility, and crossed to the far wall. It held a huge map of Southwest Asia. Her finger swept past the blue writhe of the Gulf, inland, to the northeast.
    â€œYou act as if Iran were our enemy. That’s the short view, gentlemen. Beyond Shi’a fundamentalism is still the Soviet Union.
    â€œThere are twenty-five divisions in the Transcaucasus and Turkestan military districts. Twelve of them are armored or mechanized. They’re seven hundred miles from the Gulf. There are four more, battle-hardened and highly mobile, in Afghanistan. The Soviets can drive across Iran