Free NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century by Sunil Khilnani Page B

India’s interests can be pursued.
Partnerships in a Global Context
    India’s engagement in the construction of an international order will be through a variety of instruments: participation in regional and global institutions and possible participation with groups of countries. The structures of competition in the global system will present India with a range of partnership choices. For a start, India will be sought after in great power competition. This presents a great historical opportunity for India. Traditionally India has been uneasy about formal alliances. But when national interest has required it, we have chosen closer relationships with particular powers. Yet this has been done while maintaining the core objectives of nonalignment: maintaining strategic autonomy; protecting core national interests; and, as faras possible, maintaining India’s position as an object of great power agreement. These broad objectives remain valid. But they will have to be interpreted and pursued in a new context.
    At no time since the emergence of a recognizable ‘world system’ has power been so diffused at the global level. India’s own position will need to be able to straddle many worlds, to connect across the various nodes of a more diffused global power system. In terms of constitutional vision, India is the most ‘Western’ and liberal among the non-Western powers. But we are rooted in Asia. As a poor and developing country, we also have an enormous global footprint. We have the potential to become a technological powerhouse, yet remain an informal economy. We are committed to democratic practices and are convinced that robust democracies are a surer guarantee of security in our neighbourhood and beyond. Yet we do not ‘promote’ democracy or see it as an ideological concept that serves as a polarizing axis in world politics. It follows that there are few ‘natural’ groupings—whether defined by political vision, economic profile and interests, or geopolitical security challenges—into which India can seamlessly fit. This diverse identity and the multiple interests that it underpins are actually our greatest strategic assets at the global level. For it means that India can be a uniquebridge between different worlds. Indeed, India’s bridging potential is one we must leverage and turn to our active benefit.
    It is often said that India is well placed to improve its relations with all powers simultaneously, and this has also been our experience in the past decade. But such an approach also poses real challenges and demands skilful diplomacy. For example, in the foreseeable future India will need to calibrate its value to the United States as a countervailing power vis-à-vis China, with the need to avoid provoking China into open and damaging confrontation.
    The partnership game, if played delicately, can yield real benefits. The prospect that India is a potential partner can give it leverage, both with the country courting it and with potential rivals. India must leverage to the full extent possible this dual diplomatic potential. Overall though, it is undoubtedly in India’s best interests to have a deep and wide engagement with as many powers as are willing to engage with it. This engagement is important for developing our own technology and military capabilities, as well as for spreading economic risks and for benefiting from flows of ideas and innovation distinctive to particular cultural traditions and contexts.
    Such broad international engagement is also importantas a hedge against possible contingency. In the past, it has often been the force of events that has pushed India into closer relationships with other powers. Given that the future of Sino-US relations is uncertain, and that the likely evolution of China’s own foreign policy remains unclear, India must be prepared for a contingency where, for instance, threatening behaviour by one of the major powers could encourage or even force it to be closer